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1.	  Introduction	  
	  
Metaphysical	  debates	  about	  natural	  kinds	  have	  never	  lost	  their	  appeal.	  What	  metaphysics	  of	  
nature	   licenses	   the	   most	   promising	   account	   of	   kinds?	   How	   to	   reconcile	   natural	   kinds	   with	   the	  
apparent	   historical	   contingency	   and	   interest-­‐relative	   nature	   of	   our	   taxonomic	   classifications?	   And	  
how	  to	  make	  room	  for	  contingency	  without	   jeopardising	  natural	  kinds’	  ability	   to	  support	   inductive	  
inferences?	   It	   is	   this	   distinctive	   feature	   of	   natural	   kinds,	   namely	   their	   ability	   to	   support	   inductive	  
inferences,	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  paper.	  
That	   natural	   kinds	   support	   (or	   are	   expected	   to	   support)	   inductive	   inferences,	   is	   widely	  
acknowledged	  among	  various	  philosophical	  quarters.1	  	  Inductive	  inferences	  are	  normally	  understood	  
in	   this	   context	   as	   projections	   from	   examined	   to	   (past,	   present,	   and	   future)	   unexamined	   cases,	  
following	  a	  distinguished	  pedigree	  that	  goes	  back	  to	  Goodman	  and	  Quine.2	  	  Realism	  has	  traditionally	  
had	   the	   upper	   hand	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   our	   epistemic	   achievements.	   If	   natural	   kinds	   are	  
understood	  in	  a	  realist’s	  sense	  as	  ‘carving	  nature	  at	   its	   joints’,	  an	  explanation	  is	  easily	  available	  for	  
why	  our	  inductive	  inferences	  about	  them	  have	  an	  unfailing	  tendency	  to	  succeed.	  In	  turn,	  success	  in	  
inductive	  projections	  is	  regarded	  as	  truth-­‐conducive	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  nature.	  
Unearthing	  the	  mechanism	  that	  can	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  what	  we	  ought	  to	  believe	  there	  
is	  (to	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge)	  and	  what	  there	   is,	   is	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  present	  paper.	  The	  strategy	  
here	  adopted	  is	  to	  combine	  Quinean	  naturalism	  with	  a	  suitable	  version	  of	  Kantianism	  able	  to	  deliver	  
a	  mild	  form	  of	  realism	  about	  kinds,	  which	  can	  resist	  the	  charge	  of	  constructivism	  whilst	  also	  bearing	  
the	  epistemic	  weight	  of	  inductive	  projections.	  
Quine’s	  naturalism	  set	  a	  new	  agenda	  for	  engaging	  with	  ontology:	  questions	  about	  what	  we	  
ought	   to	  believe	   there	   is	   should	  be	  deferred	   to	   and	  ultimately	   answered	   from	  within	   the	   vantage	  
point	   of	   our	   best	   scientific	   theories.3	   Natural	   kinds	   become	   the	   scientific,	   discipline-­‐specific	  
outcomes	   of	   our	   “innate	   subjective	   spacing	   of	   qualities”.4	   	   In	   the	   name	   of	   naturalism,	   induction	  
reduces	   to	   “animal	   expectation	   or	   habit	   formation”,	   and	   the	   problem	   of	   induction	   becomes	   the	  
problem	  of	  explaining	  “how	  we,	  as	  we	  now	  are	  (by	  our	  present	  scientific	  lights),	  in	  a	  world	  we	  never	  
made,	  should	  stand	  better	  than	  random	  or	  coin-­‐tossing	  chances	  of	  coming	  out	  right	  when	  we	  predict	  
by	   inductions	   which	   are	   based	   on	   our	   innate,	   scientifically	   unjustified	   similarity	   standard.”5	   The	  
question	   remains	   as	   to	   how	   our	   innate,	   pre-­‐scientific	   similarity	   standards	   could	   eventually	   evolve	  
into	   the	   theoretical	   similarity	   standards	   that	   proved	   favourable	   to	   inductions,	   and	   became	  
‘entrenched’	  in	  our	  kinds.	  
Naturalism	   is	   common	   currency	   in	   realist	   quarters,	  whereby	   the	   aforementioned	  question	  
finds	   its	   answer	   and	   ultimately	   dissolves	   into	   the	   question	   of	   how	   science	   models	   reality	   so	  
successfully.	   Among	   the	   many	   versions	   of	   realism,	   the	   brand	   aptly	   called	   by	   Boyd	   ‘realist	  
accommodationism’	  has	  provided	  the	  most	  robust	  naturalistic	  account	  of	  kinds	  and	  their	   inductive	  
projectibility	   over	   the	   past	   two	   decades.	   It	   has	   also	   mounted	   a	   series	   of	   challenges	   against	  
	  alternative	  accounts	  of	  natural	  kinds	  and	  their	  inductive	  projectibility,	  of	  both	  empiricist	  and	  Kantian	  
origins.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Kantianism,	  my	  topic	  here,	  two	  main	  challenges	  have	  been	  raised.	  
The	  first	  sees	  the	  Kantian	  as	   illegitimately	  borrowing	  key	  tools	   from	  the	  realist’s	  arsenal	  to	  
explain	   inductive	  projectibility.	  Natural	   kinds	   support	   inductive	  projections	  only	   to	   the	  extent	   that	  
some	  suitable	  version	  of	  realist	  accommodationism	  is	  met.	  Kantians	  ought	  to	  claim	  that	  in	  some	  way	  
we	  do	  have	  epistemic	  access	  to	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  underpinning	  how	  natural	  kinds	  terms	  (and	  
what	   is	   predicated	   of	   them	  within	   a	   disciplinary	  matrix)	   are	   true	   of	   things	   in	   a	  mind-­‐independent	  
world.	  For	  inductive	  projectibility	  to	  be	  retrievable,	  Kantians	  must	  allow	  for	  more	  realism	  than	  they	  
are	  willing	  to	  concede.	  
The	  second	  prominent	  challenge	  turns	  on	  its	  head	  the	  aforementioned	  surreptitious	  appeal	  
to	   a	   mind-­‐independent	   ontology	   in	   retrieving	   inductive	   projectibility.	   For	   Kantianism	   seems	   to	  
belong	   to	   a	   peculiar	   breed	   of	   anti-­‐realism,	   namely	   ‘constructivism’,	   in	   assuming	   that	   our	  mind	   or	  
conceptual	   capacities	   make	   some	   contribution	   to	   the	   causal	   structure	   of	   the	   objects	   under	  
investigation.	  
In	   what	   follows,	   I	   propose	   a	   naturalised	   version	   of	   Kantianism	   that	   can	   meet	   both	  
challenges,	   and	   deliver	   a	   mild	   form	   of	   realism	   about	   kinds	   and	   their	   inductive	   projectibility,	  
equidistant	   from	   realist	   accommodationism	   and	   constructivism.	   Naturalised	   Kantianism	   becomes	  
then	   an	   inquiry	   into	   naturalised	   ontology	   that	   does	   not	   take	   our	   theoretical	   framework	   (and	   its	  
epistemic	  success)	  as	  a	  given,	  but	  questions	  instead	  how	  it	  was	  possible	  for	  our	  pre-­‐scientific	  “animal	  
habit	   formation”	   to	   evolve	   into	   the	   successful	   science	  we	   have.	   Naturalism	  will	   provide	   the	   rock-­‐
bottom	   ground	   to	   anchor	   Kantianism	   to,	   while	   Kantianism	   will	   dovetail	   Quinean	   naturalism	   by	  
resorting	   to	   transcendental	   arguments	   to	   answer	   the	  question	   as	   to	   how	  our	   innate	  pre-­‐scientific	  
similarity	  standards	  could	  evolve	  into	  the	  theoretical	  kinds	  we	  know	  and	  love.	  
If	  transcendental	  arguments	  ultimately	  license	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  believe	  there	  
is	   a	   causal	   structure	   in	   nature	  underpinning	   the	  projectibility	   of	   our	   kinds,	   so	   be	   it.	   But	   at	   least	   a	  
Kantian	  would	  have	  secured	  an	  explanation	  of	  our	  epistemic	  achievements	  that	   is	  neither	  parasitic	  
upon	   realist	   accommodationism,	   nor	   does	   it	   land	   Kantianism	   in	   constructivist	   moorlands.	   Or	   so	   I	  
shall	  argue.6	  
	  
	  
2.	  Natural	  kinds	  and	  Naturalised	  Kantianism	  
	  
Debates	  about	  natural	  kinds	  are	  often	  regarded	  as	  belonging	  to	  the	  province	  of	  metaphysicians.	  The	  
far-­‐reaching	  appeal	  of	  Richard	  Boyd’s	  homeostatic	  property	  cluster	  kinds	  over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years	  
or	  so	  lies	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  defuse	  such	  prejudice	  by	  advancing	  a	  view	  of	  kinds	  that	  is	  unfailingly	  realist	  
and,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   sensitive	   to	   the	   interest-­‐relative	   nature	   of	   our	   taxonomic	   classifications.7	  	  
Boyd’s	   view	   serendipitously	   combines	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   accommodation	   thesis	   or	   “realist	  
accommodationism”	  with	   the	   idea	   that	   natural	   kinds	   are	   ultimately	   the	   “workmanship	   of	  women	  
and	  men”.	  
The	  view	  originates	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  an	  empiricist	  tradition	  with	  nominalist	  roots.8	  	  It	  
was	  Locke’s	  advocacy	  of	  nominal	  essences	  that	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  contemporary	  nominalist	  views	  
about	   kinds.	   Yet,	   as	   Boyd	   notes,	   there	   is	   a	   deep	   tension	   between	   Locke’s	   nominalist	   project	   in	  
metaphysics	   and	   his	   empiricist	   project	   of	   identifying	   rational	   principles	   for	   induction.	   If	   Locke’s	  
nominalism	  were	  correct,	   if	  classification	  of	   things	   into	  kinds	  were	  solely	  the	  “the	  workmanship	  of	  
the	   understanding”,	   then	   any	   attempt	   to	   justify	   inductive	   practices	   would	   be	   doomed.	   Instead,	  
inductive	  practices	  demand	  a	  realist	  presumption	  about	  natural	  kinds,	  without	  which	  they	  would	  not	  
	  be	   justified.	  Natural	  kinds	  must	   ‘carve	  nature	  at	   its	   joints’,	   for	  us	   to	  be	  able	   to	   identify	  projectible	  
generalizations.	  Empiricists	  and	  realists	  would	   then	  agree	  on	  the	  necessity	  of	  natural	  kinds	   for	   the	  
viability	  of	  successful	  inductive	  inferences,	  but	  they	  would	  disagree	  as	  to	  whether	  natural	  kinds	  pick	  
out	   real	   causal	   connections	   in	   nature,	   or	   simply	   regular	   empirical	   patterns.	   On	   Boyd’s	   view	   then,	  
natural	   kinds	   are	   licensed	  by	  our	   epistemic	   achievements:	  without	   them,	  our	   inductive	   inferences	  
would	  stand	  no	  better	  than	  random	  guessing.	  
While	   our	   kinds	  must	   ultimately	   accommodate	   to	   the	   “causal	   structure	   of	   the	  world”	   for	  
inductive	   practices	   to	   succeed,	   Boyd	   acknowledges	   that	   natural	   kinds	   are	   the	   products	   of	   our	  
classificatory	  needs,	  as	  suited	  to	  the	  inductive	  and	  explanatory	  purposes	  of	  specific	  disciplines.9	  	  That	  
natural	   	   kinds	   are	   a	   posteriori	   identifiable	   homeostatic	   clusters	   of	   imperfectly	   co-­‐occurring	  	  
properties	  has	  proved	  particularly	   fruitful	   to	  address	  vexed	   issues	  about	   the	  nature	  of	  species	  and	  
higher	  taxa	  in	  philosophy	  of	  biology.10	  
Without	   denying	   the	   undoubted	  merits	   of	   homeostatic	   property	   cluster	   kinds	   (HPCK),	   the	  
view	  comes	  under	  strain	  in	  the	  delicate	  balancing	  act	  between	  the	  realist	  rationale	  and	  the	  interest-­‐
relative	   nature	   of	   human	   classifications.	   If	   kinds	   are	   ultimately	   the	   “workmanship	   of	   women	   and	  
men”	   and	   even	   “social	   constructions”11	   satisfying	   the	   accommodation	   demands	   of	   practitioners	  
within	  a	  disciplinary	  matrix,	  a	  thin	  line	  seems	  to	  separate	  genuine	  natural	  kinds	  from	  artificial	  ones.	  
Take	  the	  case	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  familiar	  dinosaurs	  in	  the	  collective	  imagination.	  Brontosaurus	  is	  the	  
dinosaur	  made	   famous	   by	   the	   comedy	  Bringing	   up	   Baby	   (where	   Cary	   Grant	   plays	   the	   role	   of	   the	  
palaeontologist	   David	   Huxley	   reconstructing	   the	   skeleton	   of	   a	   Brontosauros),	   innumerable	   baby	  
books	  and	  clothes,	  as	  well	  as	  US	  Post	  Office	  stamp	  in	  the	  October	  1989	  release	  in	  Orlando,	  Florida.	  
The	  story	  goes	  that	  the	  palaeontologist	  O.	  C.	  Marsch	  gave	  the	  wrong	  name	  Brontosaurus	  to	  what	  is	  
effectively	   the	   skeleton	   of	   an	   Apatosauros	   ajax	   in	   1877–9.	   The	   fictitious	   natural	   kind	   term	  
Brontosauros	   entered	   common	   language	   and	   people	   referred	   (and	   continue	   to	   do	   so)	   to	  
Brontosauros	   and	  Apatosauros	   as	   if	   they	  were	   two	  distinct	   genera	  of	   the	   family	  of	   sauropods.12	   If	  
homeostatic	  property	  cluster	  kinds	  are	  resources	  for	  achieving	  accommodation,	  Brontosaurus	  could	  
be	  licensed	  alongside	  with	  Apatosaurus	  as	  satisfying	  the	  accommodation	  demands	  of	  a	  disciplinary	  
matrix	  that	  includes	  cinematography	  as	  well	  as	  zoology.	  Yet	  brontified	  paleontology	  would	  not	  fare	  
well	  on	  the	  score	  of	  inductive	  inferences.13	  	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  new.	  But	  while	  critics	  have	  flagged	  it	  
to	  hark	  back	  to	  essentialist	  views	  of	  natural	  kinds,14	  	  I	  am	  here	  suggesting	  that	  HPCKs	  fail	  to	  deter	  the	  
worrisome	   version	   of	   constructivism	   that	   realists	   of	   all	   stripes	   fear	   most,	   namely	   social	  
constructivism.	  
Yet	   there	   is	   something	   obviously	   right	   about	   Boyd’s	   malleable,	   historically	   contingent,	  
interest-­‐relative	  HPCKs,	  as	  there	  is	  something	  intuitively	  right	  about	  the	  US	  Post	  Office	  decision	  not	  
to	  withdraw	  the	  Brontosauros	  stamp,	  despite	  the	  reaction	  of	  the	  scientific	  community.	   I	  offer	  here	  
an	   alternative	   account	   of	   kinds	   that	   holds	   several	   points	   in	   common	   with	   Boyd’s,	   but	   tries	   to	  
overcome	  the	  tension	  affecting	  Boyd’s	  account	  by	  mitigating	  the	  constructivist	  implications	  inherent	  
HPCKs.	  The	  result	  is	  a	  naturalised	  version	  of	  Kantianism	  about	  kinds,	  which	  brings	  a	  humanly	  touch	  
to	  the	  realist	  dimension	  of	  the	  debate,	  while	  also	  deflating	  the	  social	  constructivist	  threat.	  
Naturalised	  Kantianism	  takes	   its	  cue	  from	  the	  naturalistic	   intuition—shared	  also	  by	  realists	  
and	  empiricists	  alike—that	  there	  are	  clusters	  of	  empirical	  properties,	  or	  to	  echo	  Quine	  “functionally	  
relevant	   groupings	   in	   nature”,15	   occasionally	  manifesting	   themselves	   via	   robust	   experimental	   data	  
(i.e.,	   data	   that	   have	   been	   selected	   as	   genuine	   and	   not	   due	   to	   background	   noise	   or	   experimental	  
error).	   There	   is	   no	  mind-­‐dependence	   or	   contribution	   of	   our	   conceptual	   framework	   at	   this	   simple	  
rock-­‐bottom	  empirical	   level,	   if	  not	  in	  the	  innocuous	  form	  that	  any	  realist	  and	  empiricist	  would	  also	  
	  accept,	  namely	  that	  our	  scientific	  instruments	  are	  built	  according	  to	  some	  principles	  of	  the	  relevant	  
theory	  in	  the	  relevant	  subject	  area.	  Nature	  takes	  its	  toll	  in	  the	  form	  of	  robust	  experimental	  data.16	  
But	  a	  naturalised	  Kantian	  would	  disagree	  with	  both	  realists	  and	  empiricists	  about	  the	  ground	  
for	  the	  projectibility	  of	  natural	  kinds.	  Whilst	  realist	  accommodationism	  grounds	  the	  projectibility	  of,	  
say,	   green	   emeralds	   in	   the	   causally	   sustained	   tendency	   of	   what	   is	   predicated	   of	   the	   natural	   kind	  
term	  ‘emerald’	  within	  a	  disciplinary	  matrix	  to	  be	  true	  of	  things	  that	  satisfy	  a	  homeostatic	  cluster	  of	  
properties	   defining	   the	   kind;	   empiricists	  with	   nominalist	   roots	   ground	   projectibility	   on	   the	   deeply	  
instilled	  conventionality	  of	  our	  taxonomic	  labels.17	  
The	   problem	   with	   the	   realist	   account	   is	   that	   homeostatic	   clusters	   of	   properties	  
underdetermine	  the	  causal	  mechanism	  allegedly	  responsible	  for	  successfully	  predicating	  something	  
true	   of	   natural	   kind	   terms	   (e.g.,	   being	   ‘green’	   for	   ‘emeralds’).	   There	   might	   be	   more	   than	   one	  
underlying	   causal	   structure	   compatible	   with	   the	   same	   cluster	   of	   empirical	   properties;	   nor	   does	  
appeal	   to	   the	   success	   of	   science	   in	   identifying	   it	   warrant	   a	   presumption	   of	   natural	   kinds	   carving	  
nature	  at	  its	  joints.	  Nominalism,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  leaves	  projectibility	  on	  shaky	  foundations:	  for	  if	  
predicating	   a	   natural	   kind	   term	   of	   something	   hinges	   ultimately	   on	   how	   instilled	   our	   taxonomic	  
conventions	  are,	  the	  wheels	  of	  inductive	  projections	  may	  well	  turn	  idly.	  
Naturalised	  Kantianism	   is	  equidistant	   from	   realist	   accommodationism	  and	  empiricism	  with	  
nominalist	  roots	  in	  playing	  down	  the	  realist	  God’s	  eye	  access	  to	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  the	  world	  and	  
giving	  a	  ‘thicker’	  account	  of	  projectibility	  than	  empiricism.	  This	  ‘thicker’	  account	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  
Kantian	   view	   that	   our	   knowledge	   concerns	   “objects	   of	   experience”	   intended	   as	   “conceptually	  
determined	   appearances”.18	   Out	   of	   Kant’s	   old-­‐fashioned	   terminology,	   a	   naturalised	   Kantian	   is	  
committed	  to	  the	  view	  that	  natural	  kinds	  are	  clusters	  of	  fairly	  stable	  empirical	  properties	  (as	  evinced	  
by	  experimental	  data)	  that	  have	  been	  conceptualised	  so	  as	  to	  make	  experience	  of	  nature	  possible.19	  	  
Inductive	   projectibility	   becomes	   then	   the	   expression	   of	   natural	   kinds’	   survival-­‐adaptive	   features,	  
namely	   their	   resilience	   in	   surviving	   both	   changes	   in	   the	   empirical	   data	   and	   in	   the	   conceptual	  
classifications	   involved.	   But,	   crucially,	   these	   conceptual	   classifications	   are	   neither	   human	  
contributions	  to	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  nature,	  nor	  mirror	   images	  of	  a	  ready-­‐made	  world.	   Instead,	  
they	  provide	  us	  with	  the	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  having	  comprehensible	  experience	  of	  nature.	  As	  
such,	  naturalised	  Kantianism	  commends	  natural	   kinds	  as	   carving	  nature	  at	   its	   joints	  without	  being	  
parasitic	  upon	  realist	  accommodationism	  or	  falling	  back	  onto	  fact-­‐constructivism.	  
But	   this	   may	   sound	   brisk	   and	   epistemologically	   dubious.	   The	   stereotype	   of	   the	   Kantian	  
preaching	  the	  unknowability	  of	  noumena	  dangerously	  looms	  on	  the	  horizon.	  For	  the	  account	  to	  be	  a	  
credible	   live	  option,	   rather	   than	   some	   infamous	  Ding-­‐an-­‐sich	   caricature,	   I	  must	  unpack	   the	   slogan	  
and	  scrutinise	  the	  challenges	  facing	  the	  account.	  
	  
	  
3.	  Boyd’s	  Realist	  Accommodationism	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Parasitism	  
	  
Objections	   to	   the	  Kantian	   line	   arise	   from	   two	  distinct	   fronts,	  which	   can	   conveniently	   be	   clustered	  
under	  Boyd’s	  apt	  term	  realist	  accommodationism	  (RA).20	  	  This	  is	  the	  view	  that	  we	  accommodate	  the	  
classificatory	   and	   conceptual	   resources	   of	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	   M	   to	   the	   causal	   structure	   of	   the	  
world.	  It	  serves	  two	  main	  purposes:	  
	  
(i)	  	  It	  gives	  an	  account	  of	  the	  reliability	  of	  our	  inductive	  practices;	  	  
(ii)	  It	  supports	  the	  metaphysical-­‐innocence	  of	  theory-­‐dependent	  methods.	  
	  
	  Realist	  accommodationism	  acts	  as	  a	  weapon	  against	  Kantianism	  about	  kinds	  by	  showing	  that	  
	  
(i.a)	   Kantianism	   is	   ultimately	   parasitic	   upon	   RA	   to	   explain	   the	   reliability	   of	   inductive	  
inferences;	  
and	  
(ii.b)	   Kantianism	   errs	   in	   taking	   metaphysically	   too	   seriously	   the	   theory-­‐dependence	   of	  
scientific	  methods.	  
	  
In	   the	   rest	   of	   this	   paper,	   I	   consider	   these	   two	   charges	   in	   turn,	   starting	   first	   with	   Boyd’s	   positive	  
arguments	  for	  theses	  (i)	  and	  (ii).	  
Thesis	  (i)	  follows	  a	  well-­‐trodden	  realist	  path	  in	  appealing	  to	  the	  success	  of	  our	  inductive	  
inferences	  as	  truth-­‐conducive	  about	  natural	  kinds.	  The	  view	  is	  known	  under	  various	  names	  and	  is	  at	  
least	  as	  old	  as	  the	  scientific	  revolution.	  When	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century,	  Francis	  Bacon	  devised	  his	  
method	  of	  tables21	  to	  find	  out	  the	  nature	  of	  phenomena	  such	  as	  heat,	  he	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  the	  
view	  that	  induction	  is	  the	  scientific	  method	  to	  investigate	  into	  the	  ‘true	  forms’	  of	  phenomena,	  
whose	  knowledge	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  used	  to	  foster	  mankind’s	  progress.	  On	  a	  similar	  line,	  the	  success	  of	  
Copernican	  theory	  in	  predicting	  novel	  phenomena,	  such	  as	  the	  phases	  of	  Venus,	  despite	  the	  Polish	  
overcast	  sky,	  became	  emblematic	  of	  a	  new	  realist	  wave,	  which	  shook	  the	  foundations	  of	  religious	  
authority.	  In	  more	  recent	  times,	  realism	  inspired	  by	  our	  epistemic	  achievements	  has	  found	  other	  
incarnations	  in	  Fresnel’s	  prediction	  of	  the	  white	  spot	  in	  optics,22	  and	  Maxwell’s	  realism	  about	  atoms	  
in	  statistical	  mechanics.23	  One	  could	  try	  to	  resist	  realism	  by	  rehearsing	  a	  similarly	  well-­‐trodden	  
antirealist	  line	  from	  the	  history	  of	  science.24	  	  	  But	  listing	  historical	  examples	  one	  way	  or	  another	  
would	  ultimately	  prove	  inconclusive	  to	  defend	  any	  claim	  about	  science’s	  success	  (or	  non-­‐success)	  in	  
tracking	  nature’s	  kinds.
A	  more	  promising	   line	  of	   response	   is	   available	   in	  philosophical	  quarters.	  Nelson	  Goodman	  
devised	   it,	   back	   in	   1947,	   with	   what	   became	   known	   as	   the	   new	   riddle	   of	   induction.25	   Goodman	  
showed	   that	   if	   we	   take	   positive	   instances	   (say,	   n	   green	   emeralds)	   of	   a	   generalization	   	   (e.g.,	   “All	  
emeralds	   are	   green”)	   as	   a	   measure	   of	   the	   success	   of	   our	   inductive	   inferences	   (under	   Nicod’s	  
principle),	   we	   are	   vulnerable	   to	   an	   unwelcome	   branching	   scenario,	   whereby	   the	   same	   positive	  
instances,	   up	   to	   a	   specified	   time	   t,	   equally	   support	   alternative	   generalizations	   (“All	   emeralds	   are	  
green”	  and	  “All	  emeralds	  are	  grue”),	   licensing	   in	   turn	   incompatible	   	  predictions	  after	   time	   t	   about	  
the	  next	  unobserved	  instances	  (e.g.,	  green	  versus	  blue	  emeralds).	  As	  Goodman	  saw	  the	  problem,	  we	  
need	  a	  theory	  of	  kinds	  that	  can	  explain	  the	  difference	  between	  ‘green’	  and	  ‘grue’	   in	  terms	  of	  their	  
respective	   projectibility	   and	   nonprojectibility.	   Goodman’s	   famous	   answer	   to	   this	   problem	   was	  
entrenchment.	   ‘Grue’	   is	   not	   well	   entrenched	   as	   ‘green’	   because	   it	   has	   not	   been	   successfully	  
projected	   as	   often	   as	   ‘green’,	   despite	   being	   perfectly	   compatible	   with	   the	   same	   data.	   Goodman	  
thought	  that	  his	  theory	  of	  projectibility	  could	  be	  used	  to	  distinguish	  more	  genuine	  from	  less	  genuine	  
kinds,	  since	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  a	  predicate	  like	  ‘green’	  involves	  the	  entrenchment	  of	  the	  very	  class	  
of	  objects	  captured	  by	  it,	  and	  hence	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  how	  akin	  a	  group	  of	  things	  are.26	  
Following	  up	  on	  Goodman,	  Quine	  believed	   that	  projectibility	   is	  ultimately	  due	   to	  similarity	  
standards,	  i.e.,	  two	  green	  emeralds	  are	  more	  similar	  than	  two	  grue	  ones	  if	  only	  one	  of	  the	  grue	  ones	  
were	  green.	  But	  defining	  similarity	  proved	  elusive	  from	  a	  logical	  point	  of	  view,	  and	  Quine	  took	  it	  as	  
innate	  and	  “part	  of	  our	  animal	  birthright”.27	  Quine’s	  answer	  to	  Goodman’s	  problem	  was	  a	   form	  of	  
Darwinian	  natural	  selection,	  whereby	  new	  hypothetical	  groupings,	  emerging	  from	  a	  growing	  theory,	  
prove	  favourable	  to	  induction	  and	  become	  ‘entrenched’.	  
	  Realists	  have	  never	  been	  too	  impressed	  by	  the	  Goodman-­‐Quine	  challenge.	  In	  fact,	  Boyd’s	  RA	  
seems	   to	   be	   the	   right	   antidote	   against	   the	   Goodmanian	   temptation	   to	   concoct	   non-­‐projectible	  
‘grue’-­‐like	  predicates.	  Our	  inductive	  practices	  are	  reliable	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  
projectible	   generalizations,	  whereby	   projectible	   generalizations	   are	   nothing	   but	   causally	   sustained	  
generalizations,	  i.e.,	  generalizations	  that	  latch	  our	  conceptual	  resources	  onto	  the	  causal	  structure	  of	  
the	   phenomena	   at	   issue.28	   RA	   supports	   projectible	   judgments,	   and	   hence	   the	   reliability	   of	   our	  
inductive	  inferences,	  via	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  tool,	  namely:	  	  
	  
1.	  	  the	  epistemic	  access	  condition	  
And	  
2.	  	  the	  accommodation	  condition.	  
	  
The	   epistemic	   access	   condition	   says	   that	   there	   is	   a	   systematic,	   causally	   sustained	  
tendency	   for	   what	   is	   predicated	   of	   a	   natural	   kind	   term	   t	   (within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	  M)	   to	   be	  
approximately	   true	  of	  things	  that	  satisfy	  a	   cluster	  of	   properties	  	  Fi	  ,	  i	  =	  1, . . . ,	  n	   defining	  the	  kind	  
referred	   to	   by	   t.	   The	   accommodation	   condition	   adds	   that	   this	   fact	   (captured	   by	   the	   former	  
condition)	  causally	  explains	  how	  the	  use	   of	   the	  term	  t	   in	   M	  contributes	  to	   the	   accommodation	  
of	   the	   inferential	  practices	  of	  M	  to	   relevant	  causal	  structure.29	  
Equipped	   with	   these	   two	   conditions,	   a	   defender	   of	   RA	   can	   mount	   her	   attack	   to	  
Kantianism	  about	  kinds30	  on	   the	   ground	  that	  
	  
	  
(i.a)	   Kantianism	   is	   ultimately	   parasitic	   upon	   RA	   to	   explain	   the	   reliability	   of	   inductive	  
inferences.	  
	  
The	  parasitism	  argument	  runs	   as	   follows:	  
	  
1.	  	  If	   the	   epistemic	   access	   condition	  (call	   it	   EAC)	   holds,	   it	   would	  causally	  explain	  how	   the	  
use	   of	   a	   natural	  kind	  term	  t	  within	  a	  disciplinary	   matrix	  M	   contributes	  to	  accommodate	  
the	   inferential	  practices	  of	  M	   to	  causal	  structure	   (accommodation	  condition,	  call	   it	  AC).	  
2.	   	   EAC	   and	   AC	   are	   jointly	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   for	   realist	  
accommodationism	   (RA).	  
3.	   	  Any	  philosophical	  view	   that	  aims	  to	  give	   an	  account	  of	   the	  reliability	   of	   our	   inductive	  
inferences	  must	   endorse	   RA.	  
4.	   	   Hence	   any	   philosophical	   view	   that	   aims	   to	   give	   an	   account	   of	   the	   reliability	   of	   our	  
inductive	  inferences	   must	   jointly	   endorse	  EAC	   and	   AC.	  
5.	  	  Kantianism	  aims	  to	   give	  an	   account	   of	  the	   reliability	   of	  our	  inductive	   inferences.	  
	   ___________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Kantianism	  must	  jointly	  endorse	  EAC	  and	  AC	  
	  
It	   would	   seem	   that	   for	   a	   Kantian	   to	   explain	   the	   reliability	   of	   our	   inductive	   inferences,	  
she	   must	   commit	   herself	   to	   the	   view	   that	   we	   accommodate	   our	   conceptual	   resources	   (as	  
deployed	   in	   inferential	   practices	   within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	   M)	   to	   the	   causal	   structure	  of	   the	  
world.	   Since	  AC	   ultimately	  depends	  on	  EAC	  holding,	  let	   us	   pause	  for	  a	   moment	  on	  EAC.	  This	  is	   a	  
re-­‐enactment	   of	   the	   realist	   view	  that	  we	   can	   access	   the	   properties	  of	   mind-­‐independent	  natural	  
kinds.	   For	  it	   seems	  possible	   to	   have	   epistemic	   access	   to	  mind-­‐independent	  natural	  kinds	   via	   the	  
	  successful	   deployment	  of	   the	   corresponding	  natural	  kind	   terms	   within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix.	   The	  
argument	  for	  EAC	   takes	   the	   form	   of	  an	   inference	   to	   the	  best	   explanation	   (IBE):	  
	  
(I)	  If	  a	  natural	  kind	   term	   ti	   picks	  out	   a	  genuine	  (i.e.,	  mind-­‐	  independent)	  natural	  kind	   Ki	  ,	  ti	  
can	   be	   successfully	  deployed	  within	   a	   disciplinary	  matrix	  M	  to	   refer	   to	   a	   homeostatically	  
stable	   cluster	   of	  properties	  Fi	  defining	   the	   kind	  Ki	  .	  
(II)	  	  Natural	  kind	   terms	   are	   usually	   successfully	  deployed	   within	   a	  disciplinary	  matrix	   M	  to	  
refer	   to	   homeostatically	  stable	   clusters	   of	  properties	  Fs	  defining	   kinds	   Ks	  (with	   s	  =	  a,	  . . .	  ,	  
z).	  
	   ___________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Therefore,	  natural	  kind	  terms	  pick	   out	  genuine	   (i.e.,	   mind-­‐	  independent)	  natural	  kinds	   Ks	  ,	  
and	   things,	   which	  terms	   ts	  are	  predicated	   of,	  have	   (most	   of)	  the	   properties	  in	  Fs	  
	  
Premise	   (II)	   captures	   a	   powerful	   semantic	   assumption,	   namely	   that	   a	   theory	   of	   reference	   for	  
natural	  kind	   terms	   in	   science	  must	  be	   a	   component	   in	   the	  explanation	  of	  our	   epistemic	   success	  
in	  induction.	  This	  premise	   is	  in	  turn	  supported	  by	  the	   following	   argument:	  
	  
(A)	   	   If	   there	   were	  unobservable	  structures	   causally	   underpinning	  homeostatic	  clusters	   of	  
properties	  Fs	  ,	   this	   would	   explain	   why	  those	   properties	  tend	   to	   co-­‐occur	   in	  nature.	  
(B)	  	  Such	  unobservable	  structures	  are	   the	   objects	   of	  scientific	  theories	  within	   a	  disciplinary	  
matrix	  M.	  
(C)	   	   Successful	   scientific	   theorising	   about	   unobservable	   structures	   gives	   us	   reasons	   for	  
thinking	  that	  homeostatically	   stable	   clusters	   of	  properties	  Fs	   identify	   genuine	   (i.e.,	  mind-­‐
independent)	  natural	  kinds	   Ks	  (with	   s	  =	  a,	  . . .	  ,z).	  
(D)	   	   Homeostatically	   stable	   clusters	   of	   properties	   Fs	   causally	   fix	   the	   reference	   of	   the	  
corresponding	  natural	  kind	   terms	   ts	  .31	  
	   ___________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Natural	   kind	   terms	   are	   usually	   successfully	   deployed	  within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	   M	   to	  
refer	   to	   homeostatically	  stable	   clusters	   of	  properties	   Fs	  defining	   kinds	   Ks	  .	  
	  
The	   successful	   deployment	   of	   natural	   kind	   terms	   to	   refer	   to	   homeostatically	   stable	  
clusters	   of	   properties	   is	   then	   ultimately	  warranted	   by	   successful	  scientific	   theorising	  about	  their	  
underlying	  unobservable	  structures.32	  The	  charge	   of	   parasitism	  against	   Kantianism	   amounts	  then	  
to	   the	   following:	   for	   a	   Kantian	  to	   give	  an	   account	   of	  why	   inductive	   inferences	   are	   reliable,	   she	  
must	   fall	   back	   on	   RA;	   in	   particular,	   she	   must	   fall	   back	   on	   EAC,	   which	   explains	   how	   our	  
successful	   deployment	   of	   natural	   kind	   terms	   within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	  M	   is	   ultimately	   the	  
product	  of	   successful	   scientific	   theorising	  about	  unobservable	  causal	   structures,	  pace	  any	   Kantian	  
claim	  about	  the	   epistemic	  inaccessibility	   of	  reality.	  
	  
4.	  A	  Kantian	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Parasitism	  
	  
A	   Kantian	   may	   reply	   to	   the	   charge	   of	   parasitism	   (i.a)	   by	   pointing	  out	   some	  ambiguities	   in	   the	  
	  steps	   (C)–(D)	   in	   the	   argument	  for	   the	   semantic	   assumption	   (II)	   behind	   EAC.	   Recall	   the	   powerful	  
realist	   intuition	  captured	  by	   (II):	  namely,	   that	   the	   accommodation	  of	  our	   inferential	   practices	   to	  
the	   causal	   structure	   of	   the	   world	   is	   explained	   and	  warranted	   by	   the	   successful	   use	   of	   natural	  
kind	   terms	  within	  a	  disciplinary	   matrix	  M	   to	   refer	  to	  homeostatically	  stable	   clusters	   of	  properties	  
defining	  mind-­‐independent	  natural	  kinds.	  
One	  may	  wonder	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  semantic	  assumption	   justifies	   the	  realist	  metaphysics	  
of	   natural	  kinds,	  as	   opposed	  to	   the	   epistemology.	  Two	  distinct	   theses	   seem	   to	   be	   interwoven	   in	  
steps	   (C)–(D)	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   argument.	   The	   first,	   captured	   by	   premise	   (D),	   might	   be	  
called	   the	   semantic	  realist	   thesis:	   namely,	   that	  the	   reference	   of	   natural	  kind	   terms	   ts	  is	   causally	  
fixed	   by	   (and	  tracks)	  homeostatically	   stable	  clusters	   of	   properties	  Fs	  .	   This	  thesis	   is	  distinct	   from,	  
nor	   does	   it	   necessarily	   bring	   along	   with	   it	   what	   might	   be	   called	   the	   epistemic	   realist	   thesis;	  
namely,	  that	  we	   ought	  to	  believe	   in,	  say,	  natural	  kind	   Ka	   because	  our	   scientific	  theorising	   about	  Ka	  
within	   a	  disciplinary	  matrix	  M	   is	   supposedly	   true.	   In	   the	   aforementioned	   inference-­‐to-­‐the-­‐best-­‐
explanation	   argument	  for	   EAC,	  the	   semantic	   assumption	   (II)	   is	  functional	  to	   defending	   the	   view	  
that	  we	   do	   have	   epistemic	   access	   to	   mind-­‐independent	  natural	  kinds,	   ultimately	   secured	   via	  our	  
successful	  scientific	  theorising	   about	  the	   causal	   structure	  underpinning	  the	   relevant	   homeostatic	  
clusters	   of	  properties	  Fs	  (as	  per	   premise	   (C))	  
A	   Kantian	   could	  happily	  endorse	  the	   semantic	  realist	  thesis	   (D),	  while	  
questioning	   the	   epistemic	   realist	   thesis	   (C).	   For	   holding	   a	   literal	   construal	   of	   the	   language	   of	  
science	   does	   not	  entail	  the	   further	  epistemic	   claim	   that	  we	  ought	  to	   believe,	   say,	   green	   emeralds	  
as	   a	   mind-­‐independent	   natural	  kind,	  because	   what	  we	   predicate	  of	   the	   natural	  kind	  term	  ti	  (e.g.,	  
‘emeralds	   are	  green’)	  within	   a	   disciplinary	  matrix	  M	  is	  true	  of	   the	   things	   that	  satisfy	   the	  cluster	  of	  
properties	   	  Fi	   .	   A	   Kantian	   would	   then	   hold	   the	   semantic	   realist	   thesis	   in	   common	   with	   RA,	   but	  
would	   resist	   the	   further	   epistemic	   realist	   conclusion	   that	  we	   ought	   to	   believe	   there	   is	   a	   natural	  
kind	  Ka	  because	   our	   successful	   scientific	   theory	   about	  Ka	   (including	   generalizations	   such	   as	   ‘all	  
emeralds	   are	   green’)	  is	  true.33	  	  
Suppose	   ti	   is	   the	   term	   ‘ether’.	   Consider	   a	   scientist	   working	   in	   the	   early	   nineteenth	  
century	   on	  optical	   phenomena	  and	  noting	   the	  existence	  of	  a	  stable	  pattern	  of	  properties	  Fi	  ,	  with	  i	  
=	  1, . . . ,	  n.	  For	   example,	   given	  a	   beam	   of	   light	  going	   through	  a	   diaphragm,	   the	   homeostatically	  
stable	   cluster	   of	  properties	  Fi	  might	   look	   like	  the	   following	   list:	  
	  
(1)	  	  When	  only	   one	   slit	   of	   the	   diaphragm	   is	   open,	  a	   white	   band	  appears	  on	   the	   screen	  
behind	   the	  diaphragm;	  
(2)	  	  When	   two	  slits	  are	  open,	   a	  sequence	  of	  white	  and	   black	  bands	  appears	  on	   the	   screen;	  
	  
(3)	   	  When	   a	   disk	   is	   placed	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   beam,	   a	   white	   spot	   appears	   in	   the	  
center	   of	  the	   dark	   shadow;	  
. . .	  . .	  	  
(n.)	   	  When	   lenses	   are	   used,	   the	   outgoing	   beam	   gets	   polarised	   so	   that	   longitudinal	  waves	  
cancel	  out	   and	   only	   transverse	  waves	  remain.	  
	  
The	  scientist	  forms	  the	  belief	   that	  the	  term	  ‘ether’	   refers	  to	  this	  homeostatically	   stable	   cluster	   of	  
properties	  Fi	   satisfied	  by	  a	  material	   medium	   that	  propagates	   transverse	  optical	  waves	   at	   work	   in	  
diffraction	  and	   polarization	  phenomena.	  She	   then	   predicates	  ti	  of	   being	   ‘luminiferous’,	   or	   light-­‐
	  bearing.	  Although	   there	   seems	   to	  be	   (and	   it	   did	   seem	   to	  be)	   a	   causally	   sustained	   tendency	  of	  
what	   is	   predicated	  of	   ti	   	  to	  be	   true	   of	   the	  thing	   that	  satisfies	  the	  property	  cluster	  Fi	  ,	   that	  thing	  
may	  well	   be	   a	   fictitious	   entity	   like	   the	   ether.	   Unless	   we	   know	   already	   that	   ti	   is	   a	   natural	   kind	  
term,	  we	   are	   in	   no	  position	  of	  knowing	   that	   what	   we	  predicate	   of	  ti	  is	  true	  of	  some	  unobservable	  
thing	  within	  a	  disciplinary	  	  matrix	  M.	  Thus,	  step	  (C)	  of	  the	  argument	  above	  can	   only	   be	   accepted	  if	  
one	   has	   already	  endorsed	  scientific	   realism;	  per	  se,	   it	   cuts	   no	   ice	   for	   what	   we	  ought	   to	   believe	  
there	   is.	  The	   semantic	  assumption	   (II)	  underwrites	  the	  realist	  metaphysics	  of	  natural	  kinds,	  but	  not	  
the	   epistemology.	   Hence,	   it	  cannot	   warrant	  our	   success	  in	   inductive	  inferences	   concerning	   ti	  in	   a	  
disciplinary	   matrix	  M.	  
This	   may	   sound	   quick.	   After	   all,	   realists	   would	   insist	   that	   it	   is	   our	   successful	   scientific	  
theorising	   about	   unobservable	   causal	   structure	   that	   gives	   us	   reasons	   for	   thinking	   that	  
homeostatically	   stable	   clusters	   of	   properties	   Fs	   identify	   genuine	   (mind-­‐independent)	   natural	  
kinds	  Ks	   .	   The	   burden	   of	   the	   proof	   lies	   with	   step	   (C)	   above.	   It	   is	   the	   success	   of	   our	   scientific	  
theorising	   about,	   say,	   green	   emeralds,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   luminferous	   ether,	   which	   ultimately	  
explains	   why	   we	   take	  some	   property	  clusters	   as	   identifying	  genuine	  natural	  kinds,	  while	   others	  do	  
not.	  One	   is	   reminded	  here	   of	   familiar	  realist	   strategies	   for	   defending	   this	   point	   (from	   Worrall’s	  
structural	   realism	   and	  Kitcher’s	   “working	   posits”	   to	   Leplin’s	   criterion	   of	   novelty),	   which	   I	   won’t	  
rehearse.34	   	   Quite	   reasonably,	   realists	   also	   argue	   that	   an	   induction	   on	   the	   history	   of	   science	   will	  
produce	   an	   overwhelmingly	   positive	   picture	   than	   the	   over-­‐exploited	   Fresnel’s	   story	   seems	   to	  
suggest.	  
A	   worry	   remains	   nonetheless.	   It	   is	   a	   worry	   about	   the	   sweeping	   adjective	   ‘successful’	  
applied	   to	   scientific	   theorising	   in	   premise	   (C),	   no	   matter	   if	   it	   is	   theorising	   that	   distinguishes	  
working	   posits	   from	   idle	   wheels,	   or	   structures	   from	   entities.	  When	  we	   say	   it	   is	   our	   successful	  
scientific	   theorising	   about	   green	   emeralds	   that	   gives	   us	   reasons	   for	   thinking	   that	  
homeostatically	   stable	   clusters	   of	   properties	   Fs	   identify	   genuine	   natural	   kinds	   Ks	   ,	   what	   do	   we	  
mean	  by	  ‘successful’?	  
We	  can	  possibly	  mean	   two	  distinct	   things.	   Either	  we	   mean	   theorising	  about	  unobservable	  
causal	  structures	  that	  can	   account	  for	   all	   the	   available	  data	  and	   seem	  to	   be	   inductively	   confirmed	  
by	   all	   positive	   instances	   we	   have	   available	   as	   of	   today	   (let	   us	   call	   this	   minimal	   definition	  
‘successful’MIN—it	   captures	   the	   successful	   past	   track	   record	   of	   scientific	   theorising	   about	  
unobservable	  structures).	  Or,	   we	  mean	  scientific	   theorising	  that	  not	   only	   is	  compatible	  with	   all	   the	  
available	  data	  but	   can	   also	  be	   used	   to	   make	  novel	  predictions	   about	   future	   unobserved	  cases	  (let	  
us	   call	   this	   maximal	   definition	   (‘successful’MAX—it	   captures	   the	   expected	   successful	   future	  
performance	   of	  scientific	   theorising).	  The	   minimal	   definition	   runs	   into	   Goodman’s	  paradox;	   the	  
maximal	   definition	   begs	  the	  question	  against	   it.	  
All	   we	   can	  legitimately	  mean	  when	  we	   say	   that	  we	   have	  been	  successfully	  theorising	   about	  
green	  emeralds	   is	  that	   current	   mineralogy	   has	  been	  inductively	  confirmed	   by	  all	  positive	  instances	  
available	   as	  of	  today	   ‘successful’MIN).	  We	  cannot	  legitimately	   mean	   that	   it	   is	  successful	  because	   it	  
can	  be	  used	  to	  make	   reliable	  predictions	   about	   future	   unobserved	   cases	  (‘successful’MAX	  ),	  unless	  
we	  know	   already	   that	   the	   instantiation	  of	   the	   antecedent	  ‘emerald’	   causes	  the	   instantiation	  of	  
the	   consequent	  ‘green’,	  but	   not	   the	   instantiation	  of	  the	  consequent	   ‘blue’	  (as	  for	   ‘grue’).	  But	   this	  
is	  exactly	  the	  sort	  of	   causal	   knowledge	   that—following	  Goodman’s	  new	  riddle	   of	   induction—is	   at	  
stake	  in	   inductive	  generalizations.	   Knowing	  the	  cause-­‐effect	  relation	  is	   precisely	   what	  is	   required	  
to	   guarantee	  that	  our	  inductive	  inference	   “All	  emeralds	  are	   green”	   is	   successful	   to	   make	   reliable	  
	  predictions	  about	  future	  unobserved	  cases	  (‘successful’MAX).35	  
Although	  realists	  may	   be	   right	  in	   inferring	  from	  a	   homeostatically	   stable	   property	  cluster	  
to	   an	   unobservable	  causal	   structure,	  the	   latter	   is	  neither	  God-­‐given	   nor	   hard-­‐wired	  in	   our	   brain.	  
In	   a	   Goodmanian	   hypothetical	   scenario,	   we	   might	   have	   developed	   a	   gruified	   mineralogy	   that	  
would	   still	   have	  been	   ‘successful’MIN	   and	   licensed	  an	   inference	   from	   the	   same	   homeostatically	  
stable	   property	  cluster	   to	   an	   alternative	  unobservable	  causal	   structure.36	   The	  success	   of	   current	  
mineralogy	   in	   licensing	   the	   reality	   of	   green	   emeralds	   has	  to	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   reflection	   on	  
the	   successful	   past	   track	  record	  of	   our	  mineralogy	   so	   far.	   In	   sum,	   appeal	   to	   successful	   scientific	  
theorising	   about	  unobservable	  causal	   structure	  does	   not	   license	  a	   realist	   presumption	  of	  natural	  
kinds	   ‘carving	  nature	  at	   its	  joints’	   in	  a	  Goodman-­‐non-­‐question-­‐begging	  way,	  pace	  premise	   (C).	  
	  
5.	  Naturalised	  Kantianism	  and	  the	  Reliability	  of	  Inductive	  Inferences	  
	  
Let	   us	   take	   stock.	   Kantianism	   is	   levelled	   with	   the	   charge	  of	   being	  ultimately	   parasitic	   on	   realist	  
accommodationism	   (RA)	   to	   explain	   the	   reliability	   of	   inductive	   inferences.	   I	   have	   foreshadowed	  
two	  possible	  responses,	   which	  question	   the	  soundness	   of	  the	  parasitism	  argument.	  The	  burden	   of	  
the	  proof	  lies	  with	   the	  epistemic	  access	  condition	  (EAC),	   whereby	   our	   epistemic	  access	  to	   genuine	  
(mind-­‐independent)	   natural	   kinds	   is	   chaperoned	   by	   the	   successful	   deployment	   of	   natural	   kind	  
terms	  within	  a	  disciplinary	   matrix	  M.	   First,	   I	  questioned	  the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   semantic	   realist	  
thesis	   (D)	   per	  se	  licenses	  realist	   epistemological	  conclusions	  about	  what	   we	  ought	  to	   believe	  there	  
is.	  Second,	   I	   raised	   doubts	  about	  the	   appeal	  to	   successful	   scientific	   theorising	  on	  causal	   structure	  
as	   a	   way	   of	   delivering	   a	   Goodman-­‐non-­‐question-­‐begging	   realist	   presumption	   about	   natural	  
kinds.	  
In	   this	   Section,	   I	   show	   that	   there	   is	   a	   defensible	   way	   for	   a	   Kantian	   to	   explain	   the	  
reliability	   of	   inductive	   inferences	   without	   being	   parasitic	   upon	   RA.	  At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   Kantian	  
strategy	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   we	   cannot	   fathom	  properties	   of	   mind-­‐independent	   natural	   kinds.	   But	  
this	   epistemic	   inaccessibility	   that	   Kantians	   share	   with	   constructive	   empiricists	   alike	   does	   not	  
prevent	   the	   former,	   anymore	   than	   the	   latter,	   from	   having	   an	   account	   of	   our	   epistemic	  
achievements.	   Moreover,	  this	   account	   proves	   to	   be	   compatible	  with	   Quinean	  naturalism	   as	   the	  
view	   that	  ontological	  questions	  should	  be	   answered	  from	  within	   natural	  science,	  and	   in	  continuity	  
with	  it.	  Hence	  the	  strategy	   that	   gives	  this	   paper	   its	  title:	  naturalised	  Kantianism.	  
Epistemic	   achievements,	  first.	   That	  our	   inductive	   inferences	   prove	   on	   average	  correct,	   our	  
generalizations	   projectible,	   and	  our	  natural	   kind	  terms	  successfully	   deployed	  within	   a	   disciplinary	  
matrix	  M	  should	   not	   come	   as	   a	  surprise.	  They	  are,	  after	  all,	  the	  product	  of	   a	  long	  natural	  selection	  
process,	   where	   many	   of	   their	   non-­‐projectible	   competitors	   were	   entertained,	   and	   discarded.37	  
Success	   in	   inductive	   projections	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   trial-­‐and-­‐error.	   Our	   extant	   inductive	   projections	  
have	   proved	   survival-­‐adaptive.	   No	   pre-­‐determined,	   carvable	   nature’s	   joints	   are	   responsible	   for	  
our	   epistemic	   achievements.	   The	   projectibility	   of	   our	   natural	   kinds	   is	   ultimately	   the	   product	   of	  
their	   survival-­‐adaptive	  features	   over	  millennia.	  
Fallibilism	   is	   not	   excluded,	   however.	   As	   new	   kinds	   come	   to	   existence,	   old	   ones	   become	  
extinct.38	  Successful	   inductive	   projections	  of	   yesterday	   may	  become	   obsolete,	   or	   prove	   favourable	  
to	   novel	   kinds.	   Fresnel’s	   successful	   projections	   about	   optical	   diffraction	   proved	   in	   the	   end	  
favourable	  to	   Maxwell’s	  electromagnetic	  waves,	   rather	  than	  the	  luminiferous	  ether.	  A	   Kantian	   can	  
thus	   be	   true	   to	   historical	  records	  about	  innumerable	  examples	   of	   discarded	  kinds,	  without	   being	  
either	  revisionist	  about	   our	  epistemic	  achievements	  or	  unpalatably	  Whiggish	   all	  along.39	  
	  A	   classical	   objection	   to	   the	   Darwinian	   account	   comes	   to	   the	   fore.	   What	   makes	   our	  
projectible	   	   kinds	   survival-­‐adaptive,	  while	   the	  non-­‐projectible	   ones	   undergo	   extinction?	   It	   is	   one	  
thing	  to	  assert	  that	  projectible	  kinds	  get	   selected.	   It	  is	   quite	  another	  thing	  to	  explain	  why	   kind	  Kb	  	  
instead	  of	  kind	  Kd	  has	   what	   it	   gets	   to	   be	   selected	   as	   projectible.	  Realists	   have	   an	   easy	  answer	   to	  
this	   question:	   unobservable	   causal	   structures.40	   If	   homeostatically	   stable	   clusters	   of	   properties	  
latch	   onto	   causal	   structures	   of	   the	   world,	   it	   is	   no	   wonder	   that	   they	   prove	   resilient	   to	   natural	  
selection	  and	  become	  our	  projectible	   kinds.	   But	   a	  Kantian	  seems	  to	   be	  at	   loss	  in	  explaining	   what	  
makes	  some	  kinds	  projectible	  over	  others.	  If	  epistemic	  access	  to	  unobservable	  causal	  structures	  via	  
successful	   scientific	   theorising	  is	   not	  an	   option,	  what	  underpins	  the	   projectibility	  of	   our	   survival-­‐
adaptive	   kinds?	  
I	   suggest	   a	   twofold	   strategy	   for	   a	   defence	   of	   the	   Darwinian	   argument	   about	   the	  
projectibility	   of	   our	   natural	  kinds.	   Their	   survival-­‐adaptive	  features	  are	   ultimately	  down	  to	   stable	  
clusters	   of	   empirical	   properties	   that	   (a)	   have	  proved	  experimentally	   robust,	  and	  (b)	  have	  survived	  
the	   historical	   evolution	   of	   our	   conceptual	   taxonomies	   to	   make	   comprehensible	   experience	   of	  
nature	   possible.	   Clusters	   that	   prove	   experimentally	   robust	   and	   conceptually	   resilient	   become	  
“entrenched”.	   Our	   projectible	   kinds	   latch	   onto	   stable	   empirical	   clusters	   evinced	   by	   robust	  
experimental	   data,	   i.e.,	   observable	   records	   of	   occurrences	   that	   cannot	   be	   ascribed	   to	   error	   or	  
background	   noise.41	   From	   the	   pre-­‐scientific	   ability	   of	   children	   to	   cluster	   objects	   with	   same	  
empirical	  properties	  (pears	   with	   pears,	   apples	   with	   apples),	   to	   the	  mineralogist’s	   ability	  to	   cluster	  
minerals,	   it	   is	   our	   human	   ability	   to	   identify	   and	   track	   recognisable	   patterns	   of	   empirical	  
properties	   in	   nature	   that	   gave	   us	   the	   upper	   hand	   in	   the	   evolutionary	   gamble.	   Peaks	   in	  
magnetometers,	   sparks	  in	   scintillation	  counters,	   bubble	   trails	   in	   cloud	   chambers	  that	  have	   proved	  
genuine	   (i.e.,	   not	   due	  to	  background	  noise	  or	  experimental	   error)	   are	   the	  sophisticated	  scientific	  
counterpart	  of	  children	   and	   laymen’s	  pre-­‐scientific	   clustering	   ability.	  
How	   stable	   clusters	   of	   empirical	   properties	   could	   have	   become	   our	   natural	   kinds,	  
especially	   the	   most	   exotic	   kinds	   envisaged	   by	   contemporary	  physics,	  biochemistry	  and	   genetics,	  
is	   a	   question	   ultimately	   for	   scientific	   practitioners.	   I	   suspect	   one	   would	   need	   to	   tell	   a	   very	  
detailed,	  discipline-­‐specific	   and	  context-­‐specific	  story	  about	  how	   stable	   clusters	   evinced	   by	   robust	  
data	  became	   part	  of	   data	  models,	   and	   how	   new	   kinds	   of	   objects	   were	   identified	   in	  the	  process	  
of	  producing	   such	  data	  models,	  and	  saved	  by	  devising	  suitable	  theoretical	  models.42	  
What	   matters	   for	  our	   purpose	   here	   is	  that	   an	  explanation	  of	  our	   epistemic	  achievements	  
needs	   not	  fall	   back	  onto	  realist	   accommodationism.	   Natural	  kinds	   need	  not	   be	  accommodated	  
to	   causal	   structures	   of	   the	   world,	   for	   them	   to	   be	   projectible.	   An	   explanation	   of	   our	   kinds’	  
projectibility	  can	  instead	  be	  given	   within	  the	  modest	  remit	  of	  a	  Kantian	   stance	  on	  stable	  clusters	  of	  
empirical	   properties	   that	   get	   selected	   for	   their	   experimental	   robustness	   and	   their	   resilience	   to	  
conceptual	  changes	   within	   a	   given	   theoretical	  framework.	  Hence,	  a	   Kantian	   can	   avail	   herself	   of	  
this	   view	   to	   answer	  the	   question	   as	   to	   why	   ‘green	  emeralds’	   have	   proved	   survival-­‐adaptive	   over	  
‘gruified’	  ones.	  
Of	   course,	   there	   are	   important	   analogies	   with	   Boyd’s	   realist	   accommodationism	   here:	  
first,	   in	  the	   idea	   that	   kinds	   are	   stable	   clusters	   of	  properties,	  and	  second,	  in	   the	   key	   intuition	  that	  
our	   kinds	   reflect	   the	   historical	   evolution	   of	   our	   conceptual	   classifications.	   But	   there	   are	   also	  
significant	   disanalogies.	   First	   and	   foremost,	   from	   the	   perspective	   here	   canvassed,	   no	   appeal	   is	  
made	  to	   accommodation	   to	   causal	   structures	  of	   the	   world,	   which	   instead	  plays	   a	  central	   role	   in	  
realist	   accommodationism.	   The	   Kantian	   adage	   that	   we	   cannot	   fathom	   properties	   of	   a	   mind-­‐
independent	  world	   is	  thus	   vindicated,	  without	  any	  Ding-­‐an-­‐sich-­‐mongering.	  
	  I	   promised	   to	   address	   two	   points	   in	   this	   Section:	   namely,	   to	   give	   an	   account	   of	   our	  
epistemic	   achievements	   non-­‐parasitic	  upon	   RA,	   and	   to	   show	  that	   such	  an	   account	   is	  compatible	  
with	   Quine’s	  naturalism.	  Back	   to	   Quinean	  naturalism	  now.	   For	   Quine,	   the	   problem	   of	   induction	  
reduced	   to	   the	   problem	  of	   explaining	   how	   “our	  innate	   subjective	   spacing	   of	   qualities	   accord	   so	  
well	  with	  the	  functionally	  relevant	  groupings	  in	   nature”.43	  His	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  was	   that	  we	  
revise	   our	   innate	   similarity	   standards	   on	   the	   strength	   of	   second-­‐order	   induction.	   More	  
importantly,	   Quine	   held	   that	   the	   innate,	   pre-­‐scientific	   similarity	   standards	   would	   eventually	  
dissolve	   in	   fragmentary	   discipline-­‐specific	   theoretical	   similarity	   standards	   (be	   they	   the	  
classification	  of	   chemical	   elements	   in	   terms	  of	   atomic	   number,	   or	   the	   classification	  of	   animals	   in	  
clades)	  to	  finally	  accomplish	   “the	  evolution	   of	  unreason	   into	  science”.44	  
In	   what	   respect	   is	   the	   Kantian	  position	   here	   canvassed	   in	   line	  with	   Quine’s	   naturalism?	  
The	   answer	  lies	   in	   the	   naturalised	   ontology	  of	   kinds	  emerging	  from	  it.	   What	  Quine	  portrayed	   as	  
innate	  “subjective	  spacing	  of	   qualities”	  finds	   its	  counterpart	  in	  Kant’s	   pre-­‐conditions	  of	  possibility	  
of	   experience,	   namely	   space	   and	   time.45	   	  Without	   	   harking	   	   back	   to	   discarded	  modes	   of	   thought	  
about	   space	   and	   time	   as	   a	   priori	   forms	   of	   intuition,	   the	   burden	   is	   on	   contemporary	   cognitive	  
neuroscience	   to	   elucidate	   the	   modalities	   through	  which	   we,	   as	   higher	   vertebrates,	   successfully	  
adapted	  to	   the	   environment	  and	  came	  to	  develop	  a	  distinctive	   spatiotemporal	  cognitive	  ability	   to	  
find	   our	   way	   around	   nature	   and	   identify	   functionally	   relevant	   clusters	   of	   properties	   in	   it.	   On	   a	  
positive	   note,	   important	   work	   has	   been	   done	   over	   the	   past	   thirty	   years	   in	   cognitive	  
neuroscience	   suggesting	   the	   validity	   of	   a	   loosely	   Kantian	   view	   of	   spatial	   representation	   in	  
vertebrates	  as	  an	   efficient	  survival	   mechanism	   in	  the	   evolutionary	  gamble.46	  
Functionally	   relevant	   clusters	   of	   empirical	   properties	   have	   survived	   natural	   selection	   in	  
allowing	   higher	   vertebrates	  to	   encounter	  a	   goal	   object	   (say,	   food,	  water,	  prey,	   predator,	   burrow,	  
etc.)	   and	  be	   able	   to	   store	  the	   location	  in	   an	  incentive	   location	   store,	   which	  can	   be	  activated	   by	  
the	  animal	  motivation	  system47	   next	  time	  it	  found	   itself	  hungry,	   thirsty,	   hunting,	   hunted,	   sick,	  and	  
so	   on.	   Few	   millennia	   later	   in	   the	   evolutionary	   tree	   of	   life,	  our	   kinds	   have	   survived	   selection	   in	  
empowering	   us	   with	   a	   sophisticated	   knowledge	   of	   nature.	   How	   stable	   clusters	   of	   empirical	  
properties	   have	   proved	   resilient	   to	   the	   historical	   evolution	   of	   our	   discipline-­‐specific	   conceptual	  
taxonomies	   is,	   ultimately,	   a	   question	   for	   historians	   of	   science	   and	   historical	   epistemologists	   to	  
address.48	  That	   they	  have	  proved	   so	  resilient	   is	  a	  fact,	   for	  which	  a	  Kantian	  explanation	  is	  available,	  
without	   the	   need	   of	   resurrecting	   either	   a	   priori	   forms	   of	   intuition	   or	   categories	   of	   the	  
understanding,	  as	   I	   shall	   clarify	   in	   Section	   7.49	   Projectibility	   is	  overall	   explainable	   from	   within	   a	  
metaphysically	   deflationist	   view	   that	   does	   not	   resort	   to	   causal	   accommodation	   between	   the	  
structures	  of	  the	  world	   and	  our	   kind	   terms	   and	   concepts.	  
Yet	   a	   more	  serious	  threat	  looms	  at	   large.	   After	  all,	   realists	   too	  can	   live	  with	   the	   historical	  
contingency	  and	   interest-­‐relative	  nature	  of	   our	   kinds.	   By	  contrast	  with	  Kantians,	   though,	  realists	  
would	  insist	   that	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  causally	   sustained	   tendency	   anchoring	   our	   natural	   kind	   terms	  
to	  causal	  structures	  in	  the	  world	  prevents	  kinds	  from	  being	  dependent	  on	  us.	   No	  wonder	  Quinean	  
naturalism	   has	   traditionally	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	   realist	   mind-­‐independence:	   namely,	   to	  
explain	   how	   we	   “in	   a	   world	   we	   never	   made,	   should	   stand	   better	   than	   random	   or	   coin-­‐tossing	  
chances	  of	  coming	  out	  right	  when	   we	   predict	  by	   induction”.	   It	  is	   this	   worrisome	  threat	  of	   mind-­‐	  
dependence	   that	  we	  must	   address	   next.	  
	  
	  
	  
	  6.	  Boyd’s	  2N2C	  Thesis	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Constructivism	  
	  
The	   heart	  of	   the	   debate	  between	   realists	   and	   Kantians	   verges	   on	   the	   mind-­‐	   independence	   or	  
dependence	   of	  natural	  kinds.	   Recall	   that	   one	  of	  the	   functions	  of	   realist	   accommodationism	   was	  
to	  
	  
(ii)	  	  support	  	  the	  metaphysical-­‐innocence	  of	  theory-­‐dependent	  methods,	  
	  
and	   hence	   to	   accuse	  
	  
(ii.b)	   	  Kantianism	   of	   erring	   in	   taking	   metaphysically	   too	   seriously	  theory-­‐dependence	   of	  
scientific	  methods.	  
	  
That	  Kantianism	   is	   tantamount	   to	   a	   form	  of	   constructivism	  is	   usually	   assumed	   in	   this	   literature	  
without	   further	   question.	   Part	   of	   the	   confusion	   surrounding	   Kantianism	   as	   a	   form	   of	  
constructivism	   is	   due	   to	   some	   of	   its	   proponents	   and	   advocates.	   The	   late	   Kuhn	   was	   primarily	  
responsible	   for	  some	  persistent	   confusion	   on	   this	  delicate	   issue,	  because	  he	  described	   his	  view	  as	  
a	  form	   of	   post-­‐Darwinian	   Kantianism.50	  Boyd	   sees	   the	   association	  with	   constructivism	   justified	  
by	   a	   key	  neo-­‐Kantian	  epistemological	  argument,	  which	  from	   the	   theory-­‐dependence	   of	   scientific	  
methods	  concludes	   that	  the	   reality	  investigated	   by	  science	  is	  partly	   constituted	  by	  the	   theoretical	  
tradition	   within	   which	   scientific	   research	   occurs.51	   While	   acknowledging	   that	   our	   scientific	  
methods	   are	   infected	   by	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   scientists	   happen	   to	   work	  with,	   realists	   see	  
theory-­‐dependent	   methods	   as	   metaphysically	   innocuous,	   and	   if	   anything,	   as	   guarantors	   of,	  
rather	   than	   obstacles	   to	   knowledge	   of	   a	   theory-­‐independent	   reality.52	   	   Theory-­‐dependent	  
methods	  would	  guarantee	   epistemically	   relevant	  contact	  between	   our	  inferential	  practices	  and	  the	  
causal	   structures	  of	  the	  phenomena	  under	   study.	  
Hence,	   realist	   accommodationists	   and	   Kantian	   constructivists	   diverge	   as	   to	   the	  
metaphysical	   import	   of	  theory-­‐dependent	  methods.	   The	   former	   affirm,	  whereas	   the	   latter	  deny	  
the	   No	   Noncausal	   Contribution	   Thesis	   (2N2C):	   the	   thesis	   that	   human	   social	   practices	  make	  no	  
noncausal	  contribution	   to	  the	  causal	  structures	  of	  the	  phenomena	   under	  study.53	  	  2N2C	  captures	  
point	   (ii)	   above,	   namely	   the	   metaphysical-­‐innocence	   of	   theory-­‐dependent	  methods	  supported	  
by	  RA.	   Let	   us	  take	   a	  closer	   look	   at	   it.	  
The	   2N2C	   thesis	   summarises	   a	   bundle	   of	   powerful	   realist	   assumptions.	   This	   bundle	   of	  
assumptions,	   which	   includes	   the	   previously	   discussed	   epistemic	   access	   condition	   (EAC)	   and	  
accommodation	   condition	   (AC),	   jointly	   reinforces	   the	   metaphysical	   conclusion	   about	   the	   mind-­‐
independence	   of	  natural	  kinds:	  
	  
	  
(a)	  	  There	  is	   a	   causally	   sustained	  tendency	  of	   what	  is	   predicated	  of	   a	   natural	  kind	   term	   ti	  
within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	   M	   to	   be	   true	   of	   things	   that	   satisfy	   a	   cluster	   of	   properties	  
defining	   the	  kind	   Ki	  (EAC).	  
(b)	   	   This	   fact	   causally	   explains	   how	   the	   use	   of	   ti	   in	  M	   contributes	   to	   accommodating	  
inferential	   practices	   to	   causal	   structure	  (AC).	  
(c)	   	  The	   relevant	   epistemic	   contact	   between	   inferential	   practices	   of	  M	   concerning	   ti	  and	  
causal	   structure	  is	  warranted	  by	  scientific	  methods.	  
(d)	  	  Scientific	  methods	  are	   theory-­‐dependent.	  
	  (e)	  	  Given	   (a)	   and	   (b),	   the	   object	   ti	  refers	   to,	   and	   the	   kind	   Ki	  the	  object	   belongs	   to,	   are	  
part	   of	   the	   causal	   structure	   of	   the	   world	   and	   they	   would	   exist	   independently	   of	   the	  
theory	  governing	  the	  methodology	  of	  the	  disciplinary	   matrix	  M.	  
(f)	   	   Given	   (b),	   (c),	   and	   (d),	   accommodating	   inferential	   	   practices	   concerning	   ti	   to	   causal	  
structure—via	  theory-­‐dependent	  methods—preserves	  causal	   structure.	  
____________________________________________________________________________	  
RA	   licenses	  mind-­‐independent	  natural	  kinds	  
	  
A	  clarification	   is	  in	  order.	   Realist	   accommodationism	  is	  in	  fact	  committed	  to	   the	  view	  that	  
in	   a	   sense,	   natural	   kinds	   are	   ‘social	   constructions’	   so	   long	   as	   they	   are	   the	   kinds	   suitable	   to	   the	  
inductive	   and	   explanatory	   demands	   of	   practitioners	   within	   a	   disciplinary	   matrix	   M.	   Yet,	   the	  
metaphysical-­‐innocence	   of	   theory-­‐dependent	   methods	   captured	   by	   2N2C	   implies	   that	  
accommodation	   is	   one-­‐way	   street.	   We	   accommodate	   inferential	  practices	   to	   causal	   structure,	  
not	  vice	  versa.	  Hence,	   the	  mind-­‐independence	  of	  natural	  kinds.	  
Building	   up	   on	   the	   aforementioned	   charge	   of	   parasitism	   concerning	   points	   (a)	   and	   (b)	  
above,	   a	   realist	   accommodationist	   can	  mount	  a	   further	  attack	  on	  Kantianism,	   this	   time	   equated	  
with	   a	   form	   of	   constructivism.	   Kantians	   are	   accused	   of	   going	   astray	   in	   some	   metaphysical	  
considerations	   surrounding	  points	   (d)–(f)	  above.	   From	  the	   theory-­‐dependence	  of	  methods	   (d),	  a	  
Kantian	  would	   seem	   to	   deduce	   the	   mind-­‐dependence	  of	   natural	   kinds	   by	   rejecting	   (e),	   i.e.,	   that	  
the	   object	   the	   term	   ti	   refers	   to,	   and	   the	   kind	   Ki	   the	   object	   belongs	   to	   would	   exist	  
independently	  of	  the	   theory	   governing	   scientific	  methodology,	  and	   by	   rejecting	   also	   (f),	   i.e.,	   that	  
accommodation	  is	  one-­‐way	   street.	  
Kantianism	   is	   ultimately	   accused	   of	   denying	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	   terms	   and	  
objects,	   inductive	   inferences	   and	   kinds,	   is	  causally	   sustained,	  and,	  hence	  that	  in	  some	  important	  
sense	  natural	   kinds	   suitable	   for	   induction	  are	   mind-­‐independent.	   But	   from	   the	   RA	   standpoint,	  
the	   mind-­‐dependence	  Kantianism	   is	  charged	   with	   should	   not	   be	   conflated	   with	   some	   form	   of	  
Berkeleyan	   idealism.	   What	   is	   at	   stake	   is	  not	   the	   claim	   that	  the	   objects	   terms	  refer	   to,	   and	   the	  
kinds	   they	   belong	   to,	   would	   not	   exist	   unless	   someone	   were	  around	   to	  observe	  or	   interact	  with	  
them.54	  	  Instead,	  at	  stake	  is	   the	  more	  subtle	   claim	   that	   the	   objects	   terms	   refer	   to,	   and	   the	   kinds	  
they	   belong	   to,	   are	  causally	   influenced	   by	   the	   theory	  governing	   scientific	   methodology	  within	   a	  
disciplinary	   matrix	  M.	  
How	   should	  we	  understand	  the	   latter	  claim?	  The	   simplest	   way	   of	   understanding	   it	  is	  as	  a	  
sheer	  methodological	  claim:	  natural	  kinds	  Ks	   are	  dependent	  upon	  the	   scientific	   theory	  that	  enters	  
in	   the	   methods	  employed	   to	   empirically	   test	   and	  eventually	   confirm	   inductive	  projections	   about	  
Ks.	   Theory-­‐	   dependence	   of	   kinds	   would	   then	   amount	   to	   a	   methodological	   claim	   about	   how	  
scientific	   hypotheses	   about	   Ks	   are	   introduced	   and	   inductive	   projections	   tested	   in	   the	   light	   of	  
theory-­‐laden	  evidence.55	  
But	   understood	   this	   way,	   theory-­‐dependence	   is	   a	   fairly	   innocuous	   claim,	   shared	   by	  
realists	   and	   empiricists	   alike.56	   Indeed,	   it	   sums	   up	   Boyd’s	   metaphysical	   innocence	   of	   theory-­‐
dependent	   methods,	   with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   the	   role	   of	   background	   theories	   in	   inductive	  
projections.57	   For	   the	   charge	   of	   constructivism	   to	   have	   a	   bite	   on	   Kantianism,	   premise	   (d)	   on	  
theory-­‐dependent	  methods	  must	   be	  construed	  as	  a	  semantic	  claim.	  Two	  options	  are	   available:	  
	  
	  (d.1)	  	  The	  theory-­‐dependence	  	  of	  	  scientific	  	  methods	  	  implies	  description-­‐dependence	  of	  
kinds.	  
(d.2)	   	   The	   theory-­‐dependence	   	   of	   	   scientific	   	  methods	   	   implies	  paradigm-­‐dependence	   of	  
kinds.	  
	  
Both	   are	   semantic	   claims	   about	   how	   kinds	   hook	   up	   to	   our	   scientific	   language	  and	   the	   latter	   in	  
turn	   shapes	   the	  ontology	   of	  nature.	   Let	  us	  consider	   how	  each,	  in	   turn,	  can	   be	   used	   to	   argue	   for	  
Kantianism	  as	  a	   form	   of	  constructivism.	  
Under	   (d.1),	   we	   find	   a	   family	   of	   views,	   in	   increasing	   order	   of	   strength.	   In	   its	   weakest	  
form,	   (d.1)	   says	   that	   natural	   kinds	   Ks	   are	   dependent	   upon	   a	   particular	   description	   given	   by	   a	  
scientific	   language.	  Hanson,	  for	   example,	  defended	   the	   view	  that	   facts	   are	   “somehow	  moulded	  by	  
the	   logical	   forms	   of	  the	   fact-­‐stating	  language”.58	   He	   gave	   the	   example	   of	  Galileo,	   who	   in	  1638	  in	  
Two	   New	   Sciences	   introduced	   the	   concept	  of	   constant	  acceleration	  for	   free	  falling	   bodies	   in	   the	  
absence	   of	   a	   proper	  language	   to	   express	   this	   concept.59	   	  Next	   in	   order	   of	   strength	   under	   (d.1),	  
we	   find	   Putnam’s	   conceptual	   relativity	  as	   the	   view	   that	   there	   is	   no	   fact	   of	   the	   matter	   that	   can	  
decide	   which	   one	   of	  alternative	  conceptual	  schemes	   is	   true.60	  	  The	   most	  radical	  version	  of	   (d.1)	  is	  
Goodman’s,	   whereby	   the	   incompatibility	   of,	   say,	   description	  P	   and	   not-­‐P	   (e.g.,	   the	   geocentric	  
and	  the	  heliocentric	  system)	  is	   resolved	  by	   assuming	  radical	   relativism	   and	   a	   plurality	  of	   ways	   of	  
world-­‐making.61	  
Regardless	  of	   which	  of	   these	  three	  variants	  is	   chosen,	  (d.1)	  serves	   the	  function	  of	   a	   hidden	  
lemma	   in	   the	   charge	   of	   constructivism	   levelled	   against	   Kantianism.	   Kantians	   would	   be	  
committed	  to	   the	   following	   argument	  from	  the	   theory-­‐dependence	  of	  scientific	  methods:	  
	  
(d)	  	  Scientific	  methods	  are	   theory-­‐dependent.	  
(d.1)	   	   The	   theory-­‐dependence	   of	   scientific	   methods	   	   implies	   description-­‐
dependence	  of	  kinds.	  
(e)	   	   The	   object	   ti	   	   refers	   to,	   and	   the	   kind	  Ki	   	   the	   object	   belongs	   to,	   although	   part	   of	   the	  
causal	   structure	  of	   the	   world,	   do	   not	  exist	   independently	   of	   the	   description	  proffered	  by	  
the	   theory	  governing	   the	  methodology	  of	  the	  disciplinary	   matrix	  M.	  
(f)	   	   Accommodating	   inferential	   practices	   concerning	   ti	   to	   causal	   structure—via	   theory-­‐
dependent	  methods—implies	   cutting	   the	  worldly	   dough	  according	  to	   different,	  and	   even	  
incompatible,	  ‘cookie-­‐cutter’	   descriptions.	  
	   ___________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Kantianism	  licenses	  mind-­‐dependent1	  natural	  kinds	  
	  
Turning	   to	   (d.2),	   this	   is	   the	   stronger	   claim	   that	   natural	   kinds	  Ks	   	  are	   dependent	   upon	   the	  
scientific	   paradigm	   endorsed	   by	   a	   given	   community	   at	   a	   given	   time,	   whereby	   a	   paradigm	   goes	  
beyond	   the	   mere	   language	   of	   a	   scientific	   theory	   in	   including	   a	   system	   of	   values,	   the	  
experimental	   set-­‐ups,	   and	   technological	   devices	   relevant	   to	   the	   theory.	   This	   view	  was	   famously	  
championed	   by	   Thomas	   Kuhn,	   with	   the	   contentious	   claim	   that	   “though	   the	   world	   does	   not	  
change	   with	   a	   change	   of	   paradigm,	   the	   scientist	   afterward	   works	   in	   a	   different	   world”.62	  	  
Experimental	  data	  cannot	  provide	   a	   hook	  to	  mind-­‐independent	   reality	  because	   operations	   and	  
measurements	   are	   themselves	   paradigm-­‐dependent.	   Moreover,	   different	   paradigms	   display	  
different	   conceptual	   resources	   that	   make	   possible	   for	   scientists	   (before	   and	   after	   a	   scientific	  
	  revolution)	  to	   see	  the	   world	   differently.63	  Thus,	   under	   the	   Kuhnian	  account,	  kinds	   are	   dependent	  
on	   the	   broader	  scientific	   paradigm	  of	   a	   given	  community	  at	  a	   given	   time.	  Also	   in	   this	   case,	   (d.2)	  
functions	   as	   a	   hidden	   lemma	   in	   the	   argument	   that	   from	   the	   theory-­‐dependence	   of	   scientific	  
methods	  would	   lead	  Kantians	  to	   embrace	   a	  Kuhnian	  version	   of	  constructivism:	  
	  
(d)	  	  Scientific	  methods	  are	   theory-­‐dependent.	  
(d.2)	  	  The	  theory-­‐dependence	  of	  scientific	  methods	  	  implies	  paradigm-­‐dependence	  
of	  kinds.	  
(e)	   	   The	   object	   ti	   refers	   to,	   and	   the	   kind	   Ki	   the	   object	   belongs	   to,	   although	   part	   of	   the	  
causal	   structure	   of	   the	   world,	   do	   not	   exist	   independently	   of	   the	   paradigm,	   which	   the	  
theory	   governing	  scientific	  methods	  belong	   to.	  
(f)	   	   Accommodating	   inferential	   practices	   concerning	   ti	   to	   causal	   structure—via	   theory-­‐
dependent	  methods—implies	   casting	   the	  worldly	   dough	   into	   different	   incommensurable	  
paradigms.	  
	   ___________________________________________________________________________	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These	   are	   the	   considerations	   that	   have	   led	   realists	   such	   as	   Boyd	   to	   identify	   Kantianism	   with	  
versions	  of	   constructivism,	   variously	  associated	  with	  the	   names	   of	  Hanson,	  Putnam,	  Goodman	  or	  
Kuhn.	  That	   our	   kinds	   are	  “constructed”	   or	   “constituted”	   by	   the	   theoretical	  tradition	   to	   which	  
we	   belong,	   that	   different	   conceptual	   schemes	   bring	   along	   with	   them	   alternative	   “worlds”,	   and	  
similar	  claims,	  have	  all	  become	  familiar	   in	  the	  philosophical	  literature	  and	   among	   science	  studies.64	  
The	   burden	   is	   on	   the	   Kantian	   to	   prove	   that	   she	   can	   defend	   theory-­‐dependence	   of	   methods	  
without	  falling	   prey	   of	  constructivism.	  
	  
7.	  A	  Kantian	  Response	  to	  the	  Challenge	  of	  Constructivism	  
	  
Can	   a	   Kantian	   eschew	   the	   Charybdis	   of	   description-­‐dependence	   and	   the	   Scylla	   of	   paradigm-­‐
dependence?	   Some	   Kantians	   might	   happily	   endorse	   (d.1)	   or	   (d.2),	   and	   the	   ensuing	   mind-­‐
dependence1or2	  they	   respectively	   license.	   But	   I	   endeavour	  to	   show	   that	   there	   is	  a	   better	   way	   of	  
understanding	   theory-­‐dependence	  of	   methods	  that	  whilst	   still	   licensing	   mind-­‐dependent	   kinds,	  
it	  would	   do	   so	  more	   in	   line	  with	   the	   Kantian	  doctrine,	  and	   without	  conflating	  Kantianism	  with	  
constructivism	  tout	   court.	   This	   alternative	  way	   of	   thinking	  about	  theory-­‐dependence	   of	   methods	  
is	   not	  tantamount	   to	   “constructing”	  kinds	  or	  conceptually	   cookie-­‐cutting	   the	  worldly	  dough.	  The	  
core	  strategy	  beneath	  it	   is,	  once	  again,	   a	   form	   of	  naturalised	  Kantianism.65	  
As	   we	   saw	   earlier,	   naturalised	   Kantianism	   encompasses	   the	   Kantian	   insight	   about	   our	  
knowledge	   being	   confined	   to	   objects	   of	   experience	   intended	   as	   conceptualised	   appearances66	  
with	   the	  Quinean	   stance	   about	   kinds	   as	  functionally	  relevant	  grouping	  	  in	  nature	  	  adopted	  	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	   their	  survival-­‐adaptive	   features.	  Whist	   the	  Quinean	  stance	  guarantees	  that	  our	  kinds	  are	  
not	   free-­‐standing	  but	   latch	  onto	  stable	  empirical	  patterns	   in	   nature,	   the	   Kantian	   transcendental	  
stance,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   secures	  a	  distinctive	  role	   for	   concepts	   as	  neither	   logical	  forms	   of	  fact-­‐
stating	   language,	   nor	  conceptual	  schemes,	  or	   Kuhnian	  paradigms.	  What	   is	  this	   distinctive	   role	   for	  
concepts?	   On	   a	   genuinely	   Kantian	  account,	  premise	   (d)	   on	   theory-­‐dependent	  methods	  must	   be	  
construed	  as	  an	  epistemic	  (as	  opposed	  to	  semantic)	  claim:	  
	  	  
(d.3)	   	  The	   	   theory-­‐dependence	   	  of	   	   scientific	   	  methods	   	   implies	  experience-­‐dependence	  of	  
kinds.	  
	  
Under	   this	   account,	   natural	  kinds	   are	  mind-­‐dependent3	   in	  an	   epistemic	   sense:	  namely,	   they	   are	  
dependent	   on	   our	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   having	   a	   comprehensible	   experience	   of	   nature.	  
Mind-­‐dependence3	   is	   not	   a	   claim	   about	   how	   natural	   kinds	   hook	   up	   to	   our	   scientific	   language	  
(hence	   Kantianism	  should	   not	   be	   confused	   with	   Hanson–Putnam	  conceptual	  relativity,	   or	   with	  
Kuhn’s	   incommensurability).	   Instead,	   mind-­‐dependence3	   	   is	   a	   claim	   about	   how	   natural	   kinds	  
ought	   to	   be	   for	   them	   to	   be	   experienceable	   for	   us.	   For	   natural	   kinds	   to	   be	   experienceable,	  
appearances	  (loosely	   intended	  in	   the	   aforementioned	  Kantian	  sense	   as	   unconceptualised	  spatio-­‐
temporal	   objects—or,	   to	   use	   a	   different	   terminology,	  as	   the	   one	   suggested	   in	   Section	   2,	   stable	  
clusters	  of	  empirical	   properties	  evinced	  by	  experimental	   data)	   must	   be	  subsumed	  under	  scientific	  
concepts	  (e.g.,	  force,	  mass,	  momentum,	   etc.).67	  	  Crucially,	  these	   concepts	  should	  neither	  be	   taken	  
in	   the	   sense	   of	   (a)	   logical	   forms	   of	   fact-­‐stating	   language	   (a`	   la	   Hanson),	   nor	   as	   (b)	   semi-­‐
Davidsonian68	  conceptual	   schemes	   (a`	   la	   Putnam),	  or	   as	   (c)	  paradigm-­‐defined	  Kuhnian	   concepts.	  
They	   must	   instead	   be	   understood	  as	   providing	   the	   epistemic	   conditions	   under	   which	   we	   can	  
form	   knowledge	   of	   the	   natural	   world.	   In	   a	   genuine	   Kantian	   sense,	   we	   form	   knowledge	   of	   the	  
natural	  	  world	  via	  transcendental	   arguments69	  taking	   the	   following	   form:	  
	  
(i)	  	  Natural	  kinds	  are	  experienceable	  
(ii)	   	   A	   necessary	   condition	   for	   natural	   kinds	   being	   experienceable	   is	   that	   they	   exhibit,	   say,	  
feature	  A.	  
(iii)	  	  Therefore,	  natural	  kinds	  exhibit	  A.70	  
	  
This	   involves	   only	   the	   minimal	  Kantian	   claim	   that	  for	   us	   to	   have	   comprehensible	  experience	  of	  
natural	  kinds,	  certain	  conditions	  must	  be	   met.	  But	  this	  minimal	  Kantian	   claim	   does	   not	  imply	   that	  
the	  way	   in	   which	   natural	  kinds	   meet	   these	   conditions	   is	   through	  any	   constructive	  activity	   of	   our	  
mind,	   as	   the	   2N2C	   thesis	   would	   suggest.	   For	   example,	   one	   such	   condition	   might	   be	   ‘being	  
causally	   structured’,	   and	   it	  might	   feature	   in	  a	   transcendental	  argument	   to	   the	  effect	   that	  natural	  
kinds	   ought	   to	   be	   causally	   structured	   for	   them	   to	   be	   experienceable.71	   	   We	   can	   then	   run	   the	  
argument	  	  from	  theory-­‐dependent	  methods	  to	  mind-­‐dependent3	  natural	  kinds	   as	  follows:	  
	  
(d)	  	  Scientific	  methods	  are	   theory-­‐dependent.	  
(d.3)	   	   the	   	   theory-­‐dependence	   	   of	   	   scientific	   	   methods	   	   implies	   experience-­‐
dependence	  of	  kinds.	  
(d.3.i)	  	  for	  kinds	  to	  be	  experienceable	  	  they	  must	  be	  causally	  structured	  
(e)	  	  Therefore	   the	  object	   ti	   refers	  to,	   and	   the	  kind	  Ki	   the	  object	   belongs	  to,	   are	   part	   of	  a	  
causally	   structured	  nature,	  which	  we	  can	  have	  experience	  of.	  
(f)	  	  Accommodating	  inferential	  	  practices	  	  concerning	  	  ti	  	  to	  	  causal	  structure—via	   theory-­‐
dependent	  methods—preserves	  causal	  structure.	  
___________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Kantianism	  licenses	  mind-­‐dependent3	  natural	  kinds	  
	  
	  Note	   here	   the	   crucial	   steps	   between	   (d.3)	   and	   (f).	   Premise	   (d.3),	   jointly	   with	   (d.3.i),	  
captures	   the	   transcendental	   argument	   to	   the	   effect	   that	  kinds	  have	   to	   be	   causally	   structured	  
for	   them	   to	   be	   experienceable	   at	   all.	   Premise	  (f)	  is	  the	   usual	   realist	   accommodation	  condition,	  
which	   a	   Kantian	   can	   indeed	  maintain,	   by	   contrast	   with	   constructivists	   of	   (d.1)-­‐	   and	   (d.2)-­‐type,	  
without	  yet	  bestowing	   on	   it	   the	   role	  of	  explaining	   our	   inductive	   success	  (as	  we	  saw	  in	  Section	   5).	  
Thus,	   there	   is	  a	   sense	   in	  which	   under	   a	   Kantian	  account,	  natural	  kinds	   are	   epistemically	  mind-­‐
dependent3	  (i.e.,	   dependent	  on	   our	   conditions	  of	  possibility	   of	  experience),	  whilst	  preserving	   the	  
realist	   intuition	   that	   our	  conditions	   of	  possibility	  of	  experience	  do	  not	   fabricate	   kinds,	   nor	   do	  our	  
inferential	  practices	   causally	  contribute	  to	   their	   causal	   structure.	  
Thus,	  while	  Boyd’s	  epistemological	  argument	   from	  theory-­‐dependence	  of	   methods	   to	   the	  
2N2C	   thesis	   rightly	   targets	   some	   versions	  of	   constructivism	   (namely,	   (d.1)	  and	   (d.2)),	  which	  have	  
occasionally	   been	   associated	   with	   Kantianism	   (especially,	   (d.2)	   with	   Kuhn’s	   soi-­‐disant	   post-­‐
Darwinian	  Kantianism),	  there	   is	  an	   alternative	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  theory-­‐dependent	  methods,	  
which	   licenses	  mind-­‐dependent	  kinds	  more	   in	   line	  with	   the	  Kantian	  view	  and	  at	   a	   distance	   from	  
constructivism.	  This	   alternative	  way	  of	   thinking	  about	  mind-­‐dependent	  kinds	   is	  captured	  by	  what	  
I	   call	   naturalized	   Kantianism,	   whereby	   the	   Kantian	   process	   of	   subsuming	   spatio-­‐temporal	  
appearances	   under	   concepts	   is	   compatible	   (and	   indeed	   continuous)	   with	   Quine’s	   naturalistic	  
project.	   Natural	   kinds	   are	   ultimately	  experience-­‐dependent	  because	   the	  concepts,	   under	   which	  
we	   subsume	   appearances,	   are	   what	   transform	   our	   ancestors’	   “subjective	   spacing	   of	   qualities”	  
into	   the	   theoretical	   kinds	   specific	   of	   each	   discipline.	   These	   same	   concepts	   that	   have	   proved	   to	  
accord	  so	  well	  with	   the	   pre-­‐scientific	   “functionally	   relevant	  groupings”	  in	   nature	  have	   empowered	  
our	   species	  with	   a	   formidable	  knowledge	   of	   the	   natural	  world	   over	  millennia:	  we	   identify	  them	  a	  
posteriori	  as	   the	   conditions	  of	   possibility	  of	  natural	  kinds	   being	  experienceable	   for	   us.72	  
Yet	   a	   defender	   of	   the	   2N2C	   thesis	   might	   rejoin	   that	   this	   epistemic	   sense	   of	   mind-­‐
dependence3	   is	   not	   water-­‐tight	   against	   the	   threat	   of	   constructivism.	   Constructivism	   may	   still	  
threat	   naturalised	   Kantianism,	   if	   a	   weakening	   substitution	   occurs	   in	   the	   transcendental	  
argument	  above:	  
	  
(i∗)	  	  Natural	  kinds	  are	  experienceable.	  
(ii∗)	   	   A	   necessary	   condition	   for	   natural	   kinds	   being	   experienceable	   is	   that	   they	   appear	   to	  
exhibit	  feature	  A	  (e.g.,	  causal	  structure).	  	  
(iii∗)	  	  Therefore	  natural	  kinds	  as	  they	  appear	  to	  us	  exhibit	  feature	  A	  (e.g.,	  causal	  structure).	  
(iv∗)	  	  Our	  concepts	  ultimately	  constitute	  the	  way	  natural	  kinds	  appear	  to	  us.	  
	  
Note	   here	  the	  weakening	   substitution	  occurring	   in	  (ii∗)	  with	  the	  verb	  appear.73	  	  If	  all	  is	  required	   of	  
natural	  kinds	   is	  to	   look	  as	  if	   they	  were	  causally	   structured	  (in	   the	   discipline-­‐specific	   way	   indicated	  
above),	   the	   prospects	   of	   mounting	   even	   a	   mild	   realist	   defence	   of	   natural	   kinds	   via	  
transcendental	   arguments	  would	   be	  unpromising.	   If	  we	  can	   have	   comprehensible	  experience	   of	  
natural	  kinds	   as	   long	   as	   they	   appear	   to	   us	   in	   a	   certain	   way,	   we	  might	   never	   be	   able	  to	   bridge	  
the	   gap	   between	   what	   we	   ought	   to	   believe	   there	   is	   and	   what	   there	   is.	   For	   if	   our	   epistemic	  
achievements	   in	   inductive	   projections	  might	   well	   be	  explained	   by	   apparent	   features	   that	   do	   not	  
track	   nature’s	  properties,	   then	   not	  only	   would	   transcendental	  arguments	   for	   those	   features	   be	  
idle	   wheels	   in	   the	   epistemic	   machinery.	   More	   worryingly,	   constructivism	   would	   creep	   into	   the	  
picture	  again	  via	  (iv∗),	  making	  (d.3)	  fall	  back	  into	  (d.1)	  or	  (d.2).	  
	  One	   natural	   option	   to	   avoid	   this	   constructivist	   rejoinder,	   is	   to	   relax	   the	   original	   Kantian	  
demand	  for	  necessary	  conditions	  as	  featuring	  in	  premise	  (ii)	  and	  (ii∗).74	  The	  constructivist	   challenge	  
arises	  when	  we	  take	   at	   face	  value	  Kant’s	   original	   demand	  for	   necessary	  conditions	  of	   experience.	  
Understood	  as	  necessary,	   conditions	  of	  possibility	   of	  experience	  would	   dictate	   the	  way	  we	  ought	  
to	   think	   of	  natural	  kinds,	   and	   since	  those	   conditions	  reside	  in	  our	   cognitive	   faculties,	   our	   concepts	  
(say,	   the	   concept	   of	   ‘being	   causally	   structured’)	  would	   function	  once	   more	   as	   cookie-­‐cutters	   in	  
the	   worldly	   dough.	   Once	   we	   relax	   the	   demand	   for	   necessary	   conditions,	   and	   allow	   those	  
conditions	  of	  experience	   to	   be	  historically	  contingent,	   the	   dubious	  constructivist	   rejoinder	  can	   be	  
eschewed.	   Natural	  kinds	   would	   still	   be	  mind-­‐dependent3	  ,	   i.e.,	   dependent	   on	   our	   conditions	   of	  
possibility	   of	  experience,	  without	   being	   conceptual	  fabrications	  of	  our	   mind.	   All	   is	  required	   is	  to	  
modify	   premise	   (d.3.i)	   to	   allow	   historically	   contingent,	   sufficient	   but	   not	   necessary	   epistemic	  
conditions	  in:	  
	  
(d)	  	  Scientific	  methods	  are	  theory-­‐dependent.	  
(d.3)	  	  The	  theory-­‐dependence	  of	  scientific	  methods	  implies	  experience-­‐dependence	  
of	  kinds.	  
(d.3.i∗)	   	   For	   kinds	   to	   be	   experienceable,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   that	   they	   (contingently)	  	  
exhibit	  	  feature	  	  A	  (e.g.,	  being	  causally	  structured)	  
(e)	  	  Therefore	   the	  object	   ti	   refers	  to,	   and	   the	  kind	  Ki	   the	  object	   belongs	  to,	   are	   part	   of	  a	  
causally	   structured	  nature,	  which	  we	  can	  have	  experience	  of.	  
(f)	   Accommodating	   inferential	   practices	   concerning	   ti	   to	   causal	   structure—via	   theory-­‐
dependent	  methods—preserves	  causal	  structure.	  
___________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Kantianism	  licenses	  mind-­‐dependent3	  natural	  kinds	  
	  
Replacing	   (d.3.i)	   with	   (d.3.i∗)	   undercuts	   the	   dubious	   constructivist	   rejoinder	   of	   affirming	   that	  
nature	   must	   be	   thus	   if	   it	   is	   to	   satisfy	   our	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   experience.	   Moreover,	  
substituting	  necessary	   conditions	  for	  sufficient,	   historically	  contingent	  ones	   is	   to	   be	   expected	  in	   a	  
post-­‐Kantian	   world,	   which	   has	   long	   abandoned	   Kant’s	   project	   of	   grounding	   the	   apodeictic	  
certainty	   of	   Euclidean	   geometry	   and	   Newtonian	  mechanics.75	   Our	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	  
experience	   evolve,	   and	   have	   an	   internal	   history	   of	   their	   own,	  often	   a	   terribly	   complicated	  one,	  
which	   follows	   the	   fate	   and	   fortune	   of	   our	   best	   scientific	   theories.	   A	   few-­‐century-­‐old	   journey	  
separates	   the	  pre-­‐scientific	  condition	  of	   ‘being	  causally	   structured’,	  from	   the	   way	   this	   condition	  is	  
understood	  and	   implemented	   in	  contemporary	  physics,	   in	  the	   case	  of	  motion	   of	  material	   bodies,	  
for	   example,	   or	   in	   evolutionary	   taxonomy.	   Hence,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   depend	   on	   our	  
historically	   contingent	  conditions	  of	  possibility	  of	  experience,	  our	   natural	  kinds	   should	   be	  expected	  
to	  depend	   on	  the	  internal	  evolution	  of	  our	   scientific	  conceptual	  system	   (such	   as,	   for	   example,	   the	  
evolution	   that	   goes	   from	   the	   laws	  of	  Medieval	   impetus	   theory	   and	   Archimedean	  hydrostatics	  to	  
Galileo’s	   science	   of	   mechanics;	   from	   Galileo’s	   new	   sciences	   to	   Newton’s	   mechanics;	   and	   from	  
Newtonian	  mechanics	   to	  classical	  continuum	  mechanics,	   in	  turn).76	  
Yet	   all	   this	   still	   leaves	  room	   to	   a	   further,	   more	   worrisome	   rejoinder.	   Whilst	  introducing	  a	  
tolerable	   level	  of	   contingency	   may	   help	   Kantianism	   escape	   the	   charge	   of	   fabricating	   kinds	   that	  
must	  conform	   to	  our	   conditions	   of	  possibility	  of	  experience,	  Kantianism	  does	  not	   seem	  to	  be	  able	  
	  to	   retrieve	   modal	   features	   of	   natural	   kinds.	   Making	   kinds	   historically	   contingent	   does	   not	   help	  
towards	  the	   realist	   intuition	  that	  unless	   the	   world	   was	   really	  causally	   structured	  and	  kinds	   really	  
carved	   nature	  at	   its	   joints,	   we	  could	   not	   have	   comprehensible	  experience.	   If	   anything,	   historical	  
contingency	  aggravates	  the	   situation.	  For	  if	   the	   conditions	  of	   possibility	   of	   having	   comprehensible	  
experience	   are	   the	  historically	   contingent	   conceptual	   resources	   displayed	   by	   our	   best	   scientific	  
theories	   in	   their	   historical	  evolution,	  why	   is	   it	   that	  we	  can	   confidently	  utter	  truths	  about,	  say,	  the	  
solubility	  of	  salt	  in	  water,	  the	  attractive	  	  power	  of	  loadstone	   on	  iron	  filings,	  and	   the	  unfailingly	  green	  
colour	   of	   emeralds?	   Aren’t	   our	   historically	   contingent	   kinds	   free-­‐floating,	   so	   to	   speak,	   in	   our	  
conceptual	   sea?	   And	   would	   not	   the	   prospect	   of	   explaining	   the	   success	   of	   our	   inductive	  
projections	  about	  salt,	   loadstone,	  and	   emeralds,	   be	  forever	   lost?	  
Naturalised	  Kantianism	  should	   not	   feel	  intimidated	  by	  this	   daunting	  prospect.	  The	  whole	  
point	   of	   wedding	   Kantianism	   with	   Quinean	   naturalism	   about	   kinds	   was	   to	   anchor	   the	  
transcendental	   enterprise	   about	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   experience	   to	   a	   rock-­‐bottom	  
naturalistic	   base,	   while	   at	   the	  same	   time	   constraining	  the	   naturalistic	  project	   in	  a	  direction	   that	  
could	   serve	   the	   purpose	  of	   explaining	   how	   our	   innate,	   pre-­‐scientific	   similarity	   standards	   could	  
turn	   into	   the	   theoretical	   kinds	   we	   know	   and	   love.	   If	   the	   conceptual	   resources	   delivered	   by	  
transcendental	   arguments	   serve	   the	   latter	   purpose,	  naturalism	   in	   turn	   latches	   the	   conceptual	  
features	   we	   ascribe	   (via	   transcendental	   arguments)	   to	   “functionally	   relevant	   groupings”	   onto	  
genuine	  causal	  patterns	  in	   nature.	  To	   echo	   both	  Quine77	  and	  Harrison,78	  creatures	  who	   believe	  and	  
act	   as	   if	  the	   world	   were	  not	   causally	   structured	  (i.e.,	   as	   if	  emeralds	  were	   not	  green,	   or	   salt	   not	  
soluble	  in	   water,	  and	  so	   on),	  would	  not	  stand	  much	   chance	   of	  surviving.	  
	  
	  
8.	  Conclusion	  
	  
Where	   does	   all	   this	   leave	   us?	   Can	   naturalised	   Kantianism	   provide	   a	   viable	   account	   of	   natural	  
kinds’	   projectibility	  without	  being	   either	  parasitic	  on	   realist	   accommodationism	   or	   falling	   prey	  
of	   constructivism?	   At	   the	   end	   of	   Section	   5,	   we	   envisaged	   an	   objection	   to	   the	   use	   of	   Quine’s	  
naturalism	  within	  the	  context	  of	  a	  broadly	  mind-­‐dependent	   conception	  of	  kinds.	  In	  the	  past	   two	  
Sections,	   I	   endeavored	   to	   distinguish	   the	   notion	   of	  mind-­‐	   dependence	   at	   work	   in	   constructivist	  
quarters,	  from	   what	   I	   take	   to	   be	  the	  distinctively	   Kantian	   notion	  of	   mind-­‐dependence,	   which	   is	  
compatible	  with	  a	  Quinean	  stance	  on	  kinds.	  I	  hope	  I	  have	  made	  the	  case	  for	  a	  serious	  reappraisal	   of	  
Kantianism	   that	   does	  not	   conflate	   it	   tout	   court	   with	   a	   variety	   of	   constructivism,	   nor	   makes	   it	  
parasitic	   on	   realist	   accommodationism	   in	   the	   explanation	   of	   our	   epistemic	   achievements.	  
Naturalised	   Kantianism	   licenses	   the	   belief	   in	   a	   causally	   structured	   nature,	   whose	   joints	   are	  
carved	   and	  carvable.	   But	   such	   belief	   is	  not	   ushered	   in	   via	   any	   God’s	   eye	  epistemic	   access	  claim,	  
but	   instead	   via	   the	   more	   modest	   strategy	   of	   transcendental	  arguments	  coupled	   with	   Quinean	  
naturalism.	  
Yet	   a	   major	  problem	  still	   stands	  on	   our	  way.	   We	   are	   still	   not	   in	   a	   position	   to	   rule	   out	  
Goodman’s	   scenario.	  Past	   experience	   cannot	  give	   inductive	  support	  to	   green	   emeralds	   any	   more	  
than	   to	   grue	   ones.	  Nor	   can	  naturalised	  Kantianism	  select	  between	  the	  evolutionary	  adequacy	   of	  
‘green	   emerald’	   over	   gruified	   ones.	   For	   all	   we	   know,	   the	   survival-­‐adaptive	   feature	   of	   the	   kind	  
green	   emerald	   shows	   how	   congenial	   our	   conceptual	   resources	   have	   proved	   so	   far	   in	   giving	   us	  
comprehensible	  experience	   of	  a	   functionally	  relevant	   cluster	   of	  empirical	   properties	  in	   nature.	  But	  
we	  cannot	  project	   from	   its	  survival-­‐adaptive	  feature	  up	   to	   now	   to	   its	   future	  survival.	   As	  with	   any	  
evolutionary	  account,	  naturalised	  Kantianism	  can	   account	   for	   our	   epistemic	   achievements	   thus	  
	  far,	  but	  does	   not	  secure	   them	  for	  the	  future.	  The	  main	  point	  of	   transcendental	   arguments	  is	   that	  
as	   long	   as	   we	   can	   have	   experience	   of	   emeralds,	   they	  exhibit	   the	   feature	  of	   being	   green	   as	   a	  
causally	   relevant	  feature.	  This	   is	   all	  naturalised	  Kantianism	   can	   explain:	   our	   success	   in	   inductive	  
projections	  up	  to	   the	   present	   time.	  
A	   realist	   is	   not	  going	   to	   be	   impressed.	  Realist	  accommodationism	   fares	  better	   on	   this	  
score	   by	  explaining	   the	   future	   projectibility	  of	  green	   emeralds	  over	   gruified	   ones	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  
former	  latching	  onto	  real	  causal	  stuff	  in	  nature.	  But,	   as	   I	   hope	   to	   have	   argued	  for	   in	   Section	   4,	   no	  
easy	   Goodman-­‐	  non-­‐question-­‐begging	  answer	   to	   this	   problem	   is	  available	   in	   the	   realist	   quarter	  
either.	  
Perhaps,	   we	   simply	   have	   to	   live	   with	   Goodman’s	   new	   riddle	   of	   induction,	   or	   bypass	   it	  
somehow	  with	  entrenchment	  or	   survival-­‐adaptive	  measures.	   It	   is	  not	  a	  God-­‐given	  metaphysics	   of	  
natural	   kinds	   that	   ultimately	   supports	   our	   inductive	   inferences	   but	   rather	   how	   well-­‐entrenched	  
our	   conceptual	   resources	  are	  in	   our	  cultural	  history.	  The	  resilience	   and	  historical	  evolution	  of	   our	  
natural	   kinds	   testifies	   to	   how	   entrenched	   our	   scientific	   taxonomy	   must	   be	   to	   grant	   us	  
comprehensible	  experience	  of	  nature.	  
The	   goal	   of	   this	   paper	   was	  not	   to	   develop	   an	   account	   of	   natural	  kinds	   that	  could	   solve	  
Goodman’s	   riddle.	   Instead,	   its	   more	   modest	   goal	   was	   to	   make	   the	   case	   for	   naturalised	  
Kantianism	   as	   a	   live	   option	  on	   a	   par	  with	   realist	  accommodationism	   in	   explaining	   our	  success	  
in	   inductive	  projections.	  As	   I	  hope	  to	   have	   shown,	  our	  natural	  kinds	  are	   not	  God-­‐given	  any	   more	  
than	  they	   are	   social	   constructs.	  Yet	   they	   are	   no	   less	  real	   than	   realist’s	   kinds,	   which	  are	   nothing	  
over	   and	   above	   our	   historically	  contingent	  kinds	   but	   reified	   as	  ‘carving	  nature’s	  joints’.	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Notes	  
	  
1	   See,	   for	   example,	   (Boyd,	   1991,	   2010;	   Kornblith,	   1993;	   Hacking,	   1991a,	   1991b,	   1993,	   2007;	  
Kuhn,	  1991,	  1993).	  
2	  See	  (Goodman,	  1973;	  Quine,	   1969).	  
3	  Quine	  famously	  portrayed	   this	  inherited	  vantage	  point	  using	  Neurath’s	  metaphor,	   see	  
(Quine,	   1975.	  Reprinted	  in	  Quine	   1981,	  p.	  72).	  
4	  Quine	   (1969),	  p.	  126.	  
5	  Ibid	  .,	  p.	  127.	  
6	   A	   ground-­‐clearing	   remark	   is	   in	   order.	   The	   version	   of	   naturalised	   Kantianism	   here	   pro-­‐	  
posed	   is	   not	   meant	   to	   implement	   Kant’s	   own	   view	   either	   in	   general,	   or	   in	   particular	   on	   the	  
subject	   matter	   of	   what	   was	   much	   later	   termed	   ‘kinds’.	   Nor	   is	   it	   engaged	   with	   the	   even	   more	  
	  ambitious	   project	   of	  repackaging	  all	  or	  part	   of	  Kant’s	   view	  into	   a	  Quinean	   version	  of	  it	  with	  all	  the	  
obvious	   problems	  of	   how	   to	   reconcile	   Quine’s	   rejection	   of	   the	   analytic/synthetic	   distinction—	  
following	   the	   path	   of	   Wilfrid	   Sellars	   (1968).	   The	   more	   modest	   strategy	   here	   adopted	   consists	  
instead	  in	   being	   true	  to	   two	   crucial	   insights	   due	   to	   Kant	  and	  Quine,	   respectively:	   namely,	   (a)	  that	  
an	   explanation	   of	   our	  epistemic	   achievements	  has	   to	   be	   searched	  for	   in	   the	   way	  we	  can	  acquire	  
knowledge,	   as	   opposed	  to	   in	   the	   way	   in	  which	   science	  allegedly	  mirrors	  nature	  from	   a	  God’s	   eye	  
point	   of	   view;	   (b)	   that	   our	   natural	   kinds	   are	   the	   evolution	   of	   pre-­‐scientific	   unjustified	   similarity	  
standards,	   part	   of	   our	   animal	   birthright.	   These	   are	   the	   two	   key	   insights,	   which	   the	   present	  
version	   of	  naturalised	  Kantianism	  will	  rely	  on.	   Hence	   the	   view	  here	   expounded	  is	  not	  committed	  
to	   endorse	  Kant’s	   full-­‐fledged	   view	  as	   displayed,	  for	   example,	   in	   the	  Metaphysical	  Foundations	  of	  
Natural	   Science,	   whereby	   Kant	   endeavoured	   to	   provide	   the	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	   physical	  
science	   (in	   particular	   Newtonian	   mechanics)	   by	   determining	   the	   empirical	   concept	   of	   matter	  
according	   to	   the	   a	   priori	   categories	   of	   the	   understanding	   (quantity,	   quality,	   relation	   and	  
modality).	   Nor	   is	   the	   present	   paper	   committed	   to	   buy	   into	   Kant’s	   view	   of	   a	   priori	   conceptual	  
resources	   and	   the	   transcendental	   idealism	   that	   in	   places	   Kant	   suggested	   as	   an	   important	  
component	  of	   his	   position	  (which	   elsewhere	   he	   termed	  instead	  as	   ‘empirical	  realism’	  to	   the	   point	  
that	  in	   the	   second	   edition	  of	   the	   Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason	   he	   added	  the	  ‘Refutation	  of	   Idealism’).	  
Instead,	  the	   only	   Kantian	  working	  posit	   of	   the	   present	  paper	  is	   the	  insight	   that	  any	   inquiry	   into	  
our	   epistemic	   achievements	   is	   ultimately	   an	   inquiry	   into	   our	   conditions	   of	   possibility	   of	  
experience,	   and	   that	  transcendental	   arguments	  can	   deliver	   conclusions	  about	  what	   we	  ought	  to	  
believe	  there	   is,	  which	  are	   compatible	  with	  Quinean	  naturalism	  about	  kinds.	  
7	  See	  (Boyd,	  1990,	  1991,	  1992,	  1999a,	  2010).	  
8	  See	  (Boyd,	  1991).	   The	   best	   known	  contemporary	  advocate	  of	   this	   nominalist	  tradition	  about	  
kinds	   is	  Ian	   Hacking	  (1991a,	  1993,	  2007).	  
9	   In	   this	   respect,	   Boyd’s	   view	   shares	   important	   points	   of	   similarity	   with	   Kitcher’s	   (1984)	  
pluralistic	  realism,	  and	  Dupre´’s	  promiscuous	   realism	  (1981).	   However,	  by	   contrast	  with	  pluralistic	  
stances,	   which	   insist	   on	   the	   existence	   of	   partially	  overlapping	  taxonomies	  (e.g.,	   for	   the	  term	   lily,	  
the	   layman	   one,	   and	   the	   botanist	   one,	   which	   includes	   garlic	   and	   onions	   under	   Lili-­‐aceae),	  
homeostatic	   property	   cluster	   kinds	   are	   said	   to	   satisfy	   the	   accommodation	   demands	   of	   a	  
disciplinary	   matrix	   that	   involves	   gardening,	   landscaping,	   and	   decorating	   as	   well	   as	   botany;	   see	  
(Boyd,	  1999b,	  p.	  162).	  
10	  See	  (Griffiths,	  1999;	  Wilson,	   2005;	  Keller,	   Boyd	   and	   Wheeler,	   2003;	  and	   Wilson,	   Barker	  and	  
Brigandt,	  2009).	  
11	  The	   terminology	  is	  due	  to	  Boyd	   (2010,	  p.	  219).	  
12	   The	   story	   goes	   that	   the	   skeleton	   Marsch	   was	   referring	   to	   was	   itself	   a	   paleontological	  
pastiche	   including	   the	   skull	   of	   a	   third	   distinct	   genus,	   namely	   Camarosauros,	   while	   the	  
Apatosauros	   would	   have	   a	   skull	   more	   similar	   to	   that	   of	   the	   genus	   Diplodocus.	   In	   1903	   the	  
palaeontologist	   Riggs	   realised	   Marsch’s	   mistake	   and	   announced	   that	   the	   real	   name	   should	   be	  
Apatosauros,	  while	  Brontosauros	  should	   be	  dismissed.	  But	  the	  name	  Brontosauros	  continued	   to	  be	  
used	  widely,	  despite	   its	  non-­‐scientific	   character.	  See	  (Gould,	  1991).	  
13	   One	   might	   reply	   that	   this	   could	   be	   an	   example	   of	   what	   Boyd	   calls	   partial	   denota-­‐	   tion	   in	  
Field’s	   sense:	   there	   can	   be	   a	   term	   t	   that	   “partially	   denotes	   different	   kinds	   k1	   and	   k2	   in	   a	  
disciplinary	  matrix	  M	  when	  the	  epistemic	  connection	  between	  the	  uses	   of	   t	   in	  M	  and	  k1	  	  explains	  
very	   nearly	   the	   same	   achievements	   in	   M	   as	   does	   the	   connection	   between	   t	   and	   k2	   .	   . . .	   [and]	  
practitioners	   in	   M	  do	  not	  distinguish	  between	  k1	  and	  k2	  ”	   (Boyd	   2010,	   p.	   216).	  These	   situations	  
	  compromise	   the	   reliability	   of	  our	   inferential	   practices,	   and,	   as	  Boyd	  points	   out,	  “an	  improvement	  
in	   reliability	  could	   be	   achieved	   by	  drawing	  the	   k1	  —	  k2	  distinction	  and	  by	  replacing	  the	   existing	   use	  
of	   t	   with	   the	   use	   of	   two	   terms	   . . .	  one	   referring	  to	   k1	  and	  the	   other	  to	  k2.	   This	   is	   denotational	  
refinement	  in	  Field’s	  sense”	  (ibid.).	  Something	  along	  these	  lines	  might	   have	   happened	  in	   the	   case	  of	  
Brontosauros	  when	   Riggs	   discovered	   that	  t	   (Brontosauros)	  referred	  to	  k2	  (Apatosauros)	   instead	  of	  
k1	   (Marsh’s	   alleged	   specimen	   of	   Brontosauros).	   But	   this	   answer	   in	   terms	   of	   denotational	  
refinement	   does	   not	   address	   the	   issue	   at	   stake	   here,	   namely	   that	   there	   seems	   to	  be	   a	   tension	  
between	  the	  social	   dimension	   of	   Boyd’s	   kinds	  and	  the	  success	   of	   inferential	  practices	  they	  license	  
(see	   Boyd	  2010,	   pp.	  217–8):	   the	  lone,	  unfunded	  researcher,	  who	   gets	   it	   right,	  does	   not	  make	  any	  
contribution	   to	   the	   reliability	   of	   our	   scientific	   practices.	   One	   is	   reminded	   here	   of	   Stephen	   Jay	  
Gould’s	   (1991,	   p.	   90)	   observation	   about	   Brontosauros:	   “No	   one	   has	   ever	   seriously	   challenged	  
Riggs’s	  conclusion,	  and	  professionals	  have	  always	   accepted	   his	   synonymy	   [with	  Apatosauros].	   But	  
Publication	  82	  of	   the	   ‘Geological	   Series	  of	   the	  Field	  Columbian	  Museum’	  for	  1903—the	  reference	  
for	  Riggs’s	   article—never	   gained	  much	  popular	   currency.	   The	  name	  Brontosauros	  . . .	  never	   lost	   its	  
luster,	  despite	  its	   technical	  limbo”.	  
14	  See	  (Devitt	   2010).	  
15	  Quine	   (1969,	  p.	  126).	  
16	  A	  social	   constructivist	  may	   rejoin	   at	   this	   point	   that	  there	   is	  a	   substantial	  causal	   story	   to	  be	  
told	   about	  experimental	  data	   themselves,	   the	   construction	  of	   scientific	   instruments,	   their	   use	  in	  
producing	  data	  and	  the	   statistical	  techniques	  of	   data	  collection	   and	  data	  analysis	   (I	   thank	  Melinda	  
Fagan	  for	  drawing	  my	  attention	  to	  this	  point).	   In	  reply,	   I	  want	   to	  draw	  attention	  to	  the	  difference	  
between	   the	   theory-­‐dependence	  of	  scientific	  methods	   (involved	   in	  data	   collection	   and	  selection)	  
and	   the	   metaphysical	   assumptions	   they	   license.	   In	   this	   respect,	   I	   diverge	   from	   social	  
constructivists	   and	   agree	   with	   Boyd	   about	  what	   he	   calls	   the	   metaphysical	   innocence	   of	   theory-­‐	  
dependent	   methods.	   I	  only	  beg	  to	  differ	  from	  Boyd	  when	  he	  classifies	  Kantianism	  under	   the	  same	  
umbrella	  of	   social	   constructivism	  and	   identifies	   the	   theory-­‐dependence	  of	   scientific	   methods	   as	  
the	  main	   epistemological	   argument	   for	   a	   form	   of	   “neo-­‐Kantian	   social	   constructivism”,	  as	   I	   shall	  
argue	   in	  more	  detail	   in	  Sections	  6	  and	   7.	  
17	   In	   this	   category	   	  we	   find	   John	   	  Stuart	   	  Mill’s	   ‘real	  Kinds’,	   for	  example.	  Hacking’s	  nominalism	  
(1993	  and	   2007)	  can	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  falling	   into	   this	  category.	  
18	   At	   the	   outset	   of	   the	   Transcendental	   Aesthetic	   Kant	   defined	   an	   appearance	   as	   ‘the	  
undetermined	   object	   of	   an	   empirical	   intuition’	   (Kant	  1781/1787,	  A20/B34).	  Appearance	   refers	  
then	  to	  an	  object	   as	  merely	  given	  in	  sensibility	  and	   conceptually	   still	  ‘undetermined’,	  not	   brought	  
yet	  under	   the	  categories	  of	  the	  faculty	  of	  understanding.	  A	  phenomenon	  or	  object	  of	  experience,	  
on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   a	   conceptually	   determined	   appearance,	   namely	   an	   appearance	   that	   has	  
been	  brought	  under	  the	  categories	  of	   the	  understanding.	   Thus,	  while	   appearances	  are	  the	  spatio-­‐
temporal	  objects	   of	  empirical	   intuitions,	  the	  data	  for	  possible	  experience,	  phenomena	  or	  objects	  of	  
experience	   are	   appearances	  brought	  under	  the	   concepts	  of	   the	   faculty	   of	   understanding	   so	  as	   to	  
make	  experience	   finally	   possible	   (see	  Kant	  1781/1787,	  B298/A239	  and	  A249).	   On	   this	  distinction,	  
see	  (Massimi	   2008,	  2010).	  
19	   In	   this	   loose	   contemporary	  sense,	   one	   can	   retain	   the	   Kantian	  original	   rationale	   for	   going	  
beyond	   empiricism	   and	   realism	   without	   committing	  oneself	   to	   the	   long	   discarded	   view	  of	   space	  
and	   time	  as	  a	  priori	   forms	   of	  sensibility	  or	   to	   a	  priori	   categories	   of	  the	  understanding.	  For	   more	  
details,	   see	  below	  Sections	  5,	  6,	  and	   7.	  
20	  See	  (Boyd,	  1999b,	  p.	  147;	  and	   2010).	  
	  21	  See	  (Bacon,	   2000).	  
22	   This	   episode	   has	   famously	   provided	   the	   rationale	   for	   Worrall’s	   epistemological	   structural	  
realism	   (1994).	  
23	  See	  (Achinstein,	   2002).	  
24	  The	   locus	  classicus	  is	  Laudan	  (1981).	  On	   a	  more	   recent	   note,	  see	  (Stanford,	  2006;	  and	  
Chang,	  2005).	  
25	  The	   riddle	  was	  first	  published	   in	  (Goodman	  1947)	  and	   reprinted	  in	  (Goodman	  1973).	  
26	   “For	   surely	   the	   entrenchment	   of	   classes	   is	   some	   measure	  of	   their	   genuineness	   as	   kinds;	  
roughly	   speaking,	   two	   things	   are	   the	  most	   akin	   according	  as	   there	   is	  a	  more	   specific	  and	   better	  
entrenched	  predicate	  that	   applies	   to	  both”,	  (Goodman	  1973,	  p.	  123).	  
27	  See	  (Quine	  1969,	  p.	  123).	  
28	  See	   on	  this	  point	  (Boyd	  1999b,	   p.	  147):	   “anyone	  who	  has	  read	  Goodman	   can	  come	  up	  with	  
indefinitely	  many	  unprojectable	   generalizations	   about	   such	  matters	   that	   fit	   all	   past	  data	   equally	  
well,	  but	   that	  are	   profoundly	  false.	  You	   were	  able	   to	   discern	   the	   true	   one	   because	  your	  inductive	  
practices	  allowed	  you	   to	   identify	  a	   generalization	  appropriately	   related	  to	   the	  causal	  structure	  of	  
the	   phenomena	   in	   question	   . . .	  what	   distinguished	   the	   generalization	   you	   accepted	   from	   the	  
unprojectable	   generalizations	  (which	   also	   fit	   the	   extant	  data)	  was	   that	  for	  any	  instantiation	   of	   it	  
that	   makes	   the	   antecedent	   true,	   the	   state	   of	   affairs	   described	   by	   the	   antecedent	   will	   (in	   the	  
relevant	   environment)	   cause	   the	   effect	   described	   by	   the	   consequent.	   Your	   deployment	   of	  
projectable	   categories	   and	   generalizations	   allowed	   you	   to	   identify	   a	   causally	   sustained	  
generalization”.	   In	  more	   recent	   time,	   (Boyd	   2010,	   p.	   213),	   has	   expressed	   the	   same	  point	   about	  
projectibility	  judgments.	  
29	  See	  (Boyd	  2010,	  p.	  215).	  
30	   See	   (Boyd,	   1999a;	   1992,	   p.	   140),	   distinguishes	   between	   classical	   Kantian	   constructivism	  
and	   sophisticated	  neo-­‐Kantian	  constructivism.	   The	   former	   is	   associated	  with	   the	  names	  of	  Kuhn	  
(1962)	   and	   Hanson	   (1958),	   and	   Boyd	   describes	   it	   as	   an	   attempt	   to	   restore	   some	   form	   of	  
foundationalism	   in	   the	   light	   of	   potentially	   embarrassing	   facts	   about	   the	   history	   of	   science.	   He	  
identifies	   a	   main	  neo-­‐Kantian	   epistemological	  argument	  for	   it,	   to	   which	   I	   turn	  in	   Section	   6.	  Boyd	  
does	   not	   mention	  any	   specific	   example	   of	   a	   sophisticated	  neo-­‐Kantian	   constructivist	  but	  makes	  
the	   case	   for	   what	   he	   sees	  as	   the	   most	   plausible	   version	   of	   constructivism	  that	  needs	   be	  taken	  in	  
serious	  philosophical	   consideration.	   He	   concludes	   that	  neo-­‐Kantian	   constructivism	   is	   successful	  
in	   grounding	  the	  reliability	  of	   inductive	  methods	  in	   science,	   only	  insofar	  as	  it	  shares	  with	  realism	  a	  
quasi-­‐naturalistic	   version	  of	  the	  accommodation	  thesis	   (Boyd	  1992,	   p.	  171).	  Whence	  the	   accusation	  
of	   parasitism	  on	   RA,	  which	   I	   consider	  in	   this	   Section	  and	  the	  next	  one.	  
31	   As	   Boyd	   clarifies	   (2010,	  p.	   224),	  RA	   is	  coupled	   with	   a	   causal	   theory	   of	   reference,	   whereby	  
natural	   kind	   terms	   ts	   track	   families	   of	   properties	  Fs	   and	   the	   descriptive	   and	   intentional	   factors	  
involved	   in	   the	   accommodationist	   conception	   of	   reference	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   playing	   a	  
causal	   role	   themselves	   in	   our	   practices	   (as	   opposed	  to	   some	   hybrid	   causal-­‐descriptive	  theory	   of	  
reference).	  
32	  See	  on	   this	  point	   also	   (Kornblith	  1993,	  p.	  43).	  
33	   In	   this	   respect,	   a	   naturalized	   Kantian	   shares	   important	   points	   in	   common	   with	  
constructive	   empiricism	   in	   resisting	   the	   God’s	   eye	   view	   on	   reality	   (the	   locus	   classicus	   is	   van	  
Fraassen,	  1980).	  For	   a	  more	  recent	  re-­‐assessment	   of	  this	  theme,	  and	   its	  analogy	  with	  Kantianism,	  
see	  (van	  Fraassen,	  2008;	  and	  Massimi,	   2009).	  
34	  See	  (Worrall,	  1994;	  Kitcher,	  1993,	  pp.	  145–8;	  and	   Leplin,	   1997).	  
	  35	  Goodman	  was	   adamant	   in	   detaching	  projectibility	   from	   truth;	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   the	  
right	  or	  true	  predicates	  have	  become	  well-­‐entrenched	   in	   our	   language,	  but	   instead	  the	   other	  way	  
around:	  “If	  our	  critic	   is	   asking,	  rather,	  why	   projections	  of	   predicates	  that	  have	  become	  entrenched	  
happen	  to	  be	  those	   projections	  that	   will	  turn	   out	   to	  be	  true,	   the	  answer	   is	  that	   we	  do	  not	   by	  any	  
means	   know	   that	   they	   will	   turn	   out	   to	   be	   true.	   When	   the	   time	   comes,	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   all	  
emeralds	   are	   green	  may	   prove	   to	   be	   false,	   and	   the	   hypothesis	  that	  all	   are	   grue	   prove	   to	  be	   true.	  
We	   have	   no	   guarantees.	  The	   criterion	  for	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   projections	  cannot	  be	   truth	  that	  is	   as	  
yet	   undetermined.	   Failure	  to	   recognise	   this	   was	   responsible,	  as	   we	   saw,	   for	   some	   of	  the	   worst	  
misconceptions	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  induction”	  (1973),	  pp.	   98–99.	  
36	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  this	  alternative	  unobservable	  causal	   structure	  in	  a	  hypothetical	  Goodmanian	  
world,	   we	   would	   proceed	   to	   infer	   reliably	   other	   empirical	   properties	   (e.g.,	   being	   blue)	   for	  
emeralds:	  
	  
(A∗)	  homeostatically	   stable	  cluster	  of	  properties	  (e.g.,	  gem,	  vitreous	  luster,	  7.5	  hard-­‐	  ness…	  )	  →	  
unobservable	   	   chemical	   structure	   	   (‘gruified’	   beryl	   with	   gruified	   traces	   of	   chromium	   and	  
vanadium)	  →	  empirical	  property	  of	  being	  blue	  after	   time	  t.	  
	  
Both	   the	  usual	   inference	  
	  
(A)	  homeostatically	  stable	  cluster	  of	  properties	   (e.g.,	  gem,	  vitreous	   luster,	  7.5.	  hardness,	   . . .	  )	  
→	  unobservable	  chemical	   structure	  (e.g.,	  beryl	  with	   traces	   of	   chromium	  and	   vanadium)	  
→	  empirical	   property	  of	  being	  green	  
	  
and	   the	   gruified	   inference	   (A∗)	   are	   successfulMIN	   .	   Claiming	  that	  (A)	   has	   to	   be	   preferred	  over	  (A∗)	  
because	   in	   addition	   to	   being	   successfulMIN	   is	   also	   successfulMAX	   begs	   the	   question	   against	  
Goodman.	  For	   all	  we	  know,	   after	   time	   t,	   a	   gruified	   beryl	  may	   give	  rise	   to	   a	   blue	   emerald	   which	  
we	  could	   then	   identify	   with	   a	   new	   kind	   of	   emerald	   (for	   example,	   a	   change	   in	   cosmic	   rays	   after	  
time	  t	  might	   result	   in	  emeralds	   being	  exposed	   to	   light	   to	   change	   their	   colour	   from	   green	  to	  blue,	  
following	   the	  example	  of	  Barker	   and	   Achinstein	   (1960).	  
37	   One	   is	   reminded	   here	   of	   van	   Fraassen’s	   Darwinian	   reformulation	   of	   the	   no	   miracle	  
argument	   (1980,	   pp.	   34–40).	   Van	   Fraassen	   uses	   the	   argument	   against	   the	   realist’s	   demand	   for	  
truth;	  I	   use	   the	   Darwinian	  argument	  against	   the	   realist’s	   plea	   for	   natural	  kinds	   ‘carving	   nature	  at	  
its	  joints’.	  
38	   Think,	   for	   example,	   of	   zoology	   where	   old	   kinds,	   such	   as	   the	   Linnean	  order	  of	   Bruta	   is	  no	  
longer	   in	   use,	   and	   others	   such	   as	   Mammalia	   was	   refined	   to	   include	   Monotremes	   (egg-­‐laying	  
mammals	   such	  as	  the	  platypus).	  
39	   For	   a	   recent	   re-­‐evaluation	   of	   the	   epistemic	   importance	   of	   alternative	   historical	   compete	  
tors	   in	  assessing	  our	   currently	   accepted	   scientific	  theories,	   see	  (Stanford,	  2006;	  Chang,	  2005).	  
40	   For	   a	   criticism	   along	   these	   lines	   of	   van	   Fraassen’s	   Darwinian	   reformulation	   of	   the	   no	  
miracle	  argument,	  see	  (Kitcher,	  1993,	  and	   Lipton,	  1991).	  
41	   One	   is	   here	   reminded	   of	   Bogen	   and	   Woodward’s	   definition	   of	   ‘data’	   as	   idiosyncratic	   to	  
specific	  experimental	  contexts	   and	   providing	  the	   evidence	  for	   inferring	   the	   existence	  of	  entities	  or	  
phenomena,	   such	   as	   the	   melting	   point	   of	   lead	   and	   weak	   neutral	   currents	   (I	   have	   discussed	  
Bogen	   and	   Woodward’s	   notion	  of	   data,	   the	   realist	   rationale	  behind	   it	   and	   suggested	   a	   Kantian	  
twist	   to	   it,	   in	   Massimi	   2011).	   Of	   course,	   the	   idea	   of	   data	   is	   borrowed	   from	   the	   empiricist	  
	  tradition.	   But,	   after	   all,	   historically,	  Kantianism	  took	   the	   lead	   from	   Hume’s	  empiricism;	   believing	  
in	   stable	   patterns	   	   of	   empirical	   regularities	   in	   nature	   or	   stable	   clusters	   of	   empirical	   properties	   is	  
compatible	  with	  maintaining	   that	  we	   cannot	  fathom	  properties	  of	   mind-­‐independent	  kinds.	  
42	  One	  example,	   taken	   from	  the	  history	   of	  particle	  physics	  and	  concerning	   the	  identification	  of	  
a	  new	  kind	  of	  particle,	   composed	  by	  a	  new	  kind	  of	  quark,	  is	  discussed	   in	  (Massimi,	   2007).	  
43	  See	  (Quine,	   1969,	  p.	  126).	  
44	  Ibid	  .,	  p.	  138	  
45	   Recall	   that	   for	   Kant,	   appearances	   as	   spatio-­‐temporal	   objects	   of	   empirical	   intuition	   are	  
“objects	   of	  a	  possible	   experience”	   (see	  footnote	  18	  above).	   They	  provide	   the	  pre-­‐conditions	  for	  a	  
possible	   experience	   of	  nature,	  which	   can	   only	   take	   place	  when	   concepts	   are	   applied	  to	   them	  and	  
suitably	   schematized	   according	  to	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   understanding,	  so	   that	   appearances	  can	  
be	  transformed	  into	   phenomena	  or	  objects	  of	  experience.	  
46	   See	   (O’Keefe	   and	   Nadel,	   1978;	   O’Keefe,	   1990,	   1993).	   O’Keefe’s	   work	   on	   experimental	  
neurology	  of	   higher	   vertebrates	  has	   identified	   in	   the	   hippocampus	   the	   innate	   spatial	   represen-­‐	  
tation	  map,	   whereby	   movements	   in	   an	   environment	  are	   coded	   as	   vectors	   representing	  distances	  
and	   directions	   with	   respect	   to	  a	  centroid.	   Animals	   would	   learn	   how	  to	  move	  around	  the	  environ-­‐	  
ment	   by	   comparing	   the	   internal	   navigation	   representation	   provided	   by	   the	   hippocampus	   with	  
the	   representation	  deriving	   from	   sensory	   stimuli.	   This	  method	   of	   learning	   would	   not	   depend	   on	  
biological	   drives	   or	   bodily	   needs:	   “it	   assumes	   that	  there	   has	   been	   an	   evolutionary	   gamble	   that	  
the	   acquisition	  of	   a	   particular	   type	   of	   knowledge	   for	   its	   own	   sake	   will	   prove	   to	   be	   an	   efficient	  
survival	  mechanism	  for	  the	   individual,	  since	   information	   acquired	  at	  a	   time	   when	   biological	  needs	  
such	  as	  hunger	   and	   thirst	   are	  absent	  might	  be	  useful	  at	   some	  subsequent	  time	  when	  those	  needs	  
arise”	   (O’Keefe	  1993,	  p.	  53).	  
47	  See	  O’Keefe	  1993,	  op.cit.	  
48	   In	   recent	   time,	   historical	   epistemology	   has	   emerged	   as	   a	   new	   trend	   that	   purports	   to	  
address	   and	   answer	   justificatory	  questions	   about	  human	  knowledge	   by	  appealing	   to	   the	  history	  of	  
the	   relevant	   scientific	   concepts.	   For	   example,	   the	   question	   as	   to	   how	   scientific	   knowledge	   can	  
advance	  claims	   of	   objectivity	  is	   addressed	  from	  within	  a	   historical	  dimension	  that	  tracks	  the	  origin	  
of	   the	   same	   concept	   of	  objectivity	   (see	  Galison	   and	   Dalston,	  2007).	  Or	   the	   question	   as	   to	  why	  a	  
cluster	  of	  well-­‐defined	  empirical	   properties	  (say,	  charge-­‐to-­‐mass	  ratio,	   discharge	   rate,	   etc.)	  came	   to	  
be	   identified	   as	   the	   ‘electron’,	   despite	   J.J.	   Thomson’s	   analysis	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘corpuscles’,	   and	  
Larmor’s	   treatment	   in	   terms	   of	   ether,	   is	   similarly	   addressed	  by	   digging	   into	   the	   history	   of	   the	  
concept;	   see	   (Arabatzis,	   2006).	   See	   also	   (Feest	   and	   Sturm,	   2011).	   Regardless	   of	   what	   one	  might	  
think	   of	   this	   new	   trend,	   my	   point	   here	   is	   that	   questions	   concerning	   the	   evolution	   and	  
sedimentation,	  so	  to	   speak,	   of	  our	   existing	  kinds	   are	  better	   addressed	   in	  their	   discipline-­‐specific,	  
historical	   context.	  
49	  The	  view	   that	  a	   contemporary	   Kantian	   position	  is	   compatible	  with	  there	  being	   no	  a	  priori	  
categories	   of	   the	   understanding,	   and	   that	   our	   concepts	   change	   with	   the	   evolution	   of	   our	  
cultural	   and	   scientific	   history	   to	   become	   ‘relativised	   a	   priori’	   has	   been	   defended	   by	   Friedman	  
(2000	  and	   2001).	  Although	  I	  am	  not	   committing	  myself	  to	   it	  here,	   the	   gist	  of	   the	  discussion	   in	  this	  
Section	   goes	   in	   a	   similar	   direction	  in	   thinking	  that	  there	  are	   important	  Kantian	   insights	  that	   can	  
be	  reconciled	  with	   the	  historical	   contingency	   of	  our	   kinds.	  
50	   See	   Kuhn	   (1990):	   “like	   the	   Kantian	   categories,	   the	   [scientific]	   lexicon	   supplies	   precon	  
ditions	  of	   possible	   experience.	   But	   lexical	   categories,	  unlike	   their	  Kantian	   forebears,	  can	   and	  do	  
change,	   both	   with	   time	   and	   with	   the	   passage	   from	   one	   community	   to	   another”.	   Kuhn’s	   soi-­‐	  
	  disant	   Kantianism	   has	   captured	   the	   philosophical	   imagination	   and	   entered	   the	   philosophical	  
literature	   see	   (Hoyningen-­‐Huene,	   1993),	   so	   that	   it	   has	   become	   common	   to	   associate	   Kantian	  
constructivism	  with	  Kuhn’s	  view	  itself.	  
51	  See	  (Boyd,	   1990;	  1992,	  p.	   136;	  1999a,	  p.	   63).	  Boyd	   (2010,	  p.	   221)	  calls	  Kuhn’s	   view	  a	   sort	  of	  
“neo-­‐Kantian	  social	  constructivism”.	  
52	  See	  Boyd	   (1992,	  p.	  143).	  
53	  Ibid	  .,	  p.	  173.	  
54	   This	   version	   of	   mind-­‐dependence	   implies	   an	   existential	   claim	   about	   kinds	   and	   is	   remote	  
from	   a	   Kantian	   viewpoint	   (after	   all,	   Kant	  was	   at	   pain	   to	   avoid	   any	   association	  with	   Berkeley’s	  
idealism	   in	   his	   Refutation	   of	   Idealism,	   second	   edition	   of	   the	   Critique	   of	   Pure	   Reason).	   Other	  
realists	   have	   criticised	   this	   notion	   of	   mind-­‐dependence,	   which	   they	   see	   as	   relevant	   to	   their	  
particular	  brand	  of	  realism.	   See	  (Kitcher,	  2001,	  p.	  182ff).	  
55	  See	  (Hanson	  1958,	  ch.1),	   building	   up	   on	   works	   in	  Gestalt	  psychology	   by	   Ko¨hler	   (1929),	  and	  
Popper	  (1959).	  
56	  van	  Fraassen,	  for	  example,	  accepts	  theory-­‐dependence	   of	   methods	  without	  endorsing	  truth	  
about	   scientific	   theories	   (1980,	   pp.	   80–83):	   “The	   working	   scientist	   is	   totally	   immersed	   in	   the	  
scientific	   world-­‐picture	   . . .	   But	   immersion	   in	   the	   theoretical	   world-­‐picture	   does	   not	   preclude	  
‘braketing’	   its	   ontological	  implications	   . . .	  For	  to	   say	   that	  someone	   is	   immersed	   in	   theory	   . . .	  is	  not	  
to	  describe	  his	  epistemic	  commitment”.	  
57	  See	   (Boyd,	  1991,	   pp.	  137–8):	   “Projectability	   judgments	  are	  almost	  always	  judgments	  
of	   theoretical	   plausibility.	  A	   theory	  is	   projectable	  just	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  what	  it	   says	   about	  both	  
observable	   and	   unobservable	   phenomena	   coheres	   appropriately	   with	   the	   best	   confirmed	  
background	  theories:	  it	  is	  projectable	  	  just	  in	  case	  it	  is	  supported	  by	  plausible	  inductive	  inferences	  
from	   the	   ‘observational’	  and	   ‘theoretical’	  claims	  embodied	   in	  previously	   well	  established	  theories	  
. . .	  Therefore	   the	   best	   account	   of	   projectability	   judgments	   is	   the	   realist	   one	   according	   to	   which	  
those	   judgments	   reflect	   inductive	   inferences	   from	   previously	   acquired	   approximate	  knowledge	   of	  
unobservable	  as	  well	  as	  observable	  phenomena”.	  
58	  Hanson	  (1958),	   ed.	  used	  (1972,	   p.	  36).	   Although	  Hanson	  is	   usually	  credited	  for	  his	  defense	  of	  
theory-­‐ladeness	  of	   observation	   (see	   footnote	  55),	   it	   is	  possible	   to	   distinguish	   a	   more	  substantial	  
claim	   he	   made	   in	   ch.	   2	   of	   the	   same	   book	   about	   ‘facts’	   and	   their	   dependence	   on	   our	   scientific	  
language.	   The	   claim	  here	   is	  that	  “the	   formation	  of	  a	   concept	   x	   in	  a	   language	   not	   rich	  enough	   to	  
express	  x	   (or	   in	  a	   language	   which	   explicitly	   rules	   out	   the	   expression	   of	  x),	   is	  always	  very	  difficult”	  
(ibid	  .,	  p.	  36).	  
59	  The	   geometrical	   notation	   dominant	  at	   Galileo’s	   time	   led	   people	   to	   think	   of	   velocities	   as	  
proportional	   to	   spaces	   traversed	  as	   opposed	  to	   times	   (which	  were	   regarded	  as	   a	   trivial	   function	  
of	   velocities).	   Only	   after	   Newton’s	   fluxions,	   did	   it	   become	   possible	   to	   symbolise	   constant	  
acceleration	  as	  ds	  /dt.	  Hanson’s	  moral	  is	  that	  although	  it	  might	   be	  possible	   to	   think	  of	   a	   concept	  x	  
(e.g.,	   constant	   acceleration)	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   proper	   mathematical	   language	   to	   express	   it,	  
significant	   conceptual	  difficulties	  stand	   on	   the	  way.	  
60	  Putnam’s	  example	   is	   that	  of	   a	   world	  of	   three	  objects	  x1	   ,	  x2	   ,	  x3	   a`	   la	   Carnap,	   and	  how	  this	  
same	   world	  would	  count	  as	   a	   world	  of	   seven	   objects	  for	  the	  Polish	  logician	  Lesniewski	  (namely,	  x1	  ,	  
x2	  ,	  x3	  ,	  x1	  +	  x2	  ,	  x1	  +	  x3	  ,	  x2	  +	  x3	  ,	  x1	  +	  x2	  +	  x3	  ).	  Putnam	  	  uses	  the	  example	  against	  the	   metaphysical	  
realist’s	   view,	   according	  to	   which	   there	   is	   only	   one	   world	   that	  we	   can	   slice	   in	  different	   ways,	   to	  
use	   the	   ‘cookie	   cutter’	   metaphor:	   this	   way	   of	   posing	   the	   problem	  would	   leave	  wide	   open	   the	  
mereological	   question	  as	   to	   what	   the	   ‘parts’	  of	   the	  worldly	   dough	   are	   (Putnam,	  1990,	  p.	  98).	  For	  
	  a	   recent	   discussion	   of	   Putnam’s	   view,	   see	   (Boghossian	   2006,	   p.	   36),	   from	   which	   the	   expression	  
‘cookie-­‐cutting	  the	  worldly	   dough’	   is	  borrowed.	  
61	  “Consider,	  to	  begin	  with,	  the	  statements	   ‘The	   sun	  always	  move’	   and	  ‘The	   sun	  never	  moves’	  
which,	   though	  equally	   true,	   are	   at	   odds	  with	   each	   other.	   Shall	   we	   say,	   then,	   that	   they	  describe	  
different	  worlds	   as	  there	   are	   such	  mutually	  exclusive	  truths?	   Rather,	  we	  are	   inclined	   to	  regard	  the	  
two	   strings	   of	  words	   not	   as	   complete	   statements	  with	   truth-­‐values	  of	   their	   own	   but	  as	   elliptical	  
for	   some	   such	   statements	   as	   ‘Under	   frame	   of	   reference	   A,	   the	   sun	   always	   move’	   and	   ‘Under	  
frame	   of	   reference	   B,	   the	   sun	   never	   moves’	   –statements	   that	  may	   both	   be	   true	   of	   the	   same	  
world.	  Frames	  of	   reference,	  though,	  seem	   to	  belong	  less	   to	   what	  is	   described	  than	  to	   systems	   of	  
description:	  and	  each	   of	   the	   two	   statements	  relates	   what	  is	   described	  to	   such	   a	  system.	   If	   I	   ask	  
about	  the	  world,	   you	   can	  offer	   to	   tell	  me	  how	   it	   is	  under	  one	   or	  more	   frames	  of	   reference;	   but	   if	  
I	   insist	   that	  you	   tell	   me	   how	   it	   is	   apart	   from	   all	   frames,	   what	   can	   you	   say?	  We	   are	   confined	   to	  
ways	  of	  describing	  whatever	  is	  described.	  Our	   universe,	   so	   to	   speak,	   consists	  of	   these	   ways	   rather	  
than	  of	   a	  world	  or	   of	  worlds”.	  See	  (Goodman	  1978,	  pp.	  2–3,	  emphasis	  added).	  
62	  See	  (Kuhn	  1962,	  third	   ed.,	  p.	  121).	  
63	   Kuhn	   	  contented	   	   that	  Galileo	  saw	  the	  swinging	  stone	  differently	   from	  Aristotle	  because	  “he	  
measured	  only	  weight,	  radius,	  angular	  displacement,	  and	  time	  per	  swing,	  which	  were	  precisely	  the	  
data	   	   that	   	   could	   be	   interpreted	   to	   yield	   Galileo’s	   laws	   for	   the	   pendulums	   . . .	  Given	   Galileo’s	  
paradigms,	  pendulum-­‐like	  regularities	  were	   very	   nearly	  accessible	   to	  inspection	   . . .	  Regularities	  that	  
could	   not	   have	  existed	   for	   an	  Aristotelian	  (and	   that	  are,	   in	  fact,	  nowhere	  precisely	   exemplified	   by	  
nature)	  were	   consequences	  of	   immediate	  experience	   for	   the	  man	   who	   saw	  the	   swinging	   stone	   as	  
Galileo	   did”	   (ibid	  .	   p.	   124).	   It	   is	   the	   conceptual	  switch	   from	  motion	  as	   the	  distance	  to	   a	   final	  end	  
point,	   to	  motion	   as	   the	   distance	   from	   the	   origin	   that	   “underlies	   and	   gives	   sense	   to	   most	   of	   his	  
well-­‐known	   ‘laws	   of	   motion’”	   (ibid	   .).	   These	   jointly	   (paradigm-­‐dependent)	   regularities	   and	  
conceptual	  parameters	  were	   in	   turn	  made	   possible	   by	   a	  series	   of	   crises	   and	   intellectual	  changes	  
that	  had	   occurred	  in	  the	  Medieval	   impetus	   theory	  and	  Neoplatonism,	  among	   others.	  
64	   Indeed,	   many	   more	   versions	   of	   constructivism	   could	   be	   identified	   than	   the	   two	  
aforementioned	  ones,	   to	   which	   I	   intend	   to	   confine	   my	  attention	  in	   this	   paper.	   Under	   the	   social	  
constructivist	  account	  for	   example,	   kinds	   Ks	  depend	   upon	   a	  community	  of	  scientists,	  C,	   that—via	  
laboratory	   life—constructs	   them.	   This	   form	   of	   social	   constructivism	   is	   most	   prominently	  
advocated	  by	   Bruno	  Latour.	   For	  example,	   Latour’s	  (1999,	   ch.	   2)	   analyses	   how	   via	   laboratory	  life	  
scientists	   construct	   pedological	   claims	   (where	   pedology	   is	   the	   science	   of	   soil)	   about	  whether	   or	  
not	   the	   Amazon	   Forest	   is	   advancing	   or	   retreating	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   savanna.	   At	   the	   very	  
beginning	   of	  the	  book	   (p.	  6),	  Latour	  gives	  the	   following	   caricature	  of	  the	  Kantian	  project	   and	   how	  
it	   was	   superseded	   by	   science	   studies:	   “Kant	  had	   invented	   a	   form	   of	   constructivism	   in	  which	   the	  
mind-­‐in-­‐the-­‐vat	   built	   everything	   by	   itself	   but	   not	   entirely	   without	   constraints:	   what	   it	   learned	  
from	  itself	   had	  to	  be	   universal	  and	  could	  be	   elicited	   only	   by	   the	   experiential	  contact	  with	   a	  reality	  
out	   there,	   a	   reality	   reduced	   to	   its	   barest	   minimum,	   but	   there	   nonetheless.	   For	   Kant,	   there	  was	  
still	  something	   that	   revolved	  around	  the	  crippled	   despot,	   a	  green	  planet	   around	  this	  pathetic	  sun.	  
It	  would	  not	   be	  long	  before	   people	   realized	   that	   this	   ‘Transcendental	  Ego’,	  as	  Kant	  named	  it,	  was	  
a	   fiction,	   a	   line	   in	   the	   sand	  (. .	  .)	  .	   It	   was	   soon	   replaced	   by	  a	  more	   reasonable	  candidate,	  society”.	  
It	   is	  beyond	   the	   aim	   and	   scope	   of	   this	   paper	   to	   engage	   with	   this	   form	   of	   constructivism,	  and	   I	  
prefer	   to	   concentrate	   my	   attention	   to	   the	   philosophically	   more	   subtle	   versions	   captured	   by	  
(d.1)	  and	   (d.2)	  above.	   For	  an	   insightful	   discussion,	   see	  (Knorr	  Cetina,	  1993;	  and	   Sismondo,	  1993).	  
65	  A	   clarification	  is	   in	   order	  here.	   That	  some	   suitable	  version	   of	   naturalism	   is	  compatible	  with	  
	  Kantianism	   is	  not	  new.	  Most	  notably,	  Strawson	  (1985)	  argued	  for	   a	   Humean	  version	   of	  naturalism	  
in	   combination	  with	   transcendental	  arguments	  directed	   to	   the	   existence	  of	   external	  objects.	  On	  
Strawson’s	  ‘naturalistic’	  view,	  the	  question	   as	  to	  whether	   there	   are	  or	  are	  not	   external	  objects	   is	  
futile	   and	   has	   to	   be	   granted	   in	   all	   our	   reasoning	   (for	   a	   discussion	   and	   dismissal	   of	   Strawson’s	  
strategy,	   see	   (Stern,	   1999,	   pp.	   63–65).	   As	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   from	   the	   discussion	   so	   far,	   the	  
naturalism	  I	  am	  wedding	  Kantianism	  to,	   is	  of	  a	  different,	   Quinean	  variety.	   Its	  key	  role	   is	  to	  anchor	  
a	   loosely	  Kantian	   transcendental	  strategy	  about	  our	   conceptualization	  of	  appearances	  to	   reality	  
itself,	   via	  Quine’s	   ‘Darwinian’	  take	   on	   the	   evolution	  of	  our	   pre-­‐scientific	   ‘spacing	  of	  qualities’	   into	  
natural	  kinds	   (see	  footnote	  72).	  
66	   I	   am	   here	   assuming	   the	   one-­‐world	   interpretation	   of	   Kant	   defended	   by	   Bird	   (1962)	   and	  
Allison	  (1983),	  and	   not	   the	  two-­‐world	   view,	  under	   which	  there	  would	  effectively	  be	  an	  ontological	  
dimension	   in	   the	   Kantian	   view	   that	  our	   knowledge	   is	   confined	   to	   phenomena,	   as	   per	   Bennett	  
(1966),	  Guyer	  (1987)	  and	  van	   Cleve	   (1999).	  According	  to	  Allison’s	   one-­‐world	  interpretation,	  Kant’s	  
view	   is	   not	   a	   metaphysical	   theory	   that	   affirms	   the	   unknowability	   of	   the	   ‘real’	   and	   relegates	  
knowledge	   to	   the	   realm	   of	   representations	   (appearances).	   Against	   the	   two-­‐world	   view,	   which	  
effectively	   interprets	   the	   Kantian	   doctrine	   as	   a	   phenomenalistic	   account	   of	   what	   is	   knowable	  
(hence	   the	   two	  worlds	   of	  mental	   representations	  and	   physical	   entities),	   Allison	   has	   argued	   that	  
the	   Kantian	   distinction	   between	   appearances	   and	   things	   in	   themselves	   should	   be	   understood	  
instead	   in	   its	   transcendental	   (as	   opposed	   to	   empirical	   sense)	   as	   follows:	   (1)	   appearances	   are	  
spatio-­‐temporal	   entities,	   i.e.,	   things	   insofar	  as	   they	   are	   viewed	   as	   subject	   to	   the	   conditions	  of	  
human	   sensibility;	   (2)	   things	   in	   themselves	   are	   instead	   things	   insofar	   as	   they	   are	   viewed	   as	  
independent	   of	   these	   conditions.	   So,	   there	   is	   only	   one	   world	   but	   two	   ways	   of	   looking	   at	   the	  
objects	   in	   it	   as	   either	   independent	  of	   the	   conditions	  of	   human	  experience	   (qua	  noumena)	  or	   as	  
dependent	  on	   them	   (qua	  phenomena).	  
67	   In	   Kant’s	   own	   doctrine,	   of	   course,	   the	   process	   of	   subsuming	   appearances	   under	   concepts	  
required	   a	   rather	   complex	   architectonic	   involving	   the	   categories	   of	   the	   understanding,	  
transcendentally	   deduced	  to	  account	  for	  the	  various	  forms	  of	   judgments	  available,	  and	  the	  system	  
of	  the	  principles	   of	  the	  understanding,	  namely	   the	  schematization	  of	  the	  categories	  according	   to	  
time.	   Hence,	   the	   resultant	  Axioms	   of	   Intuitions	   (for	   the	   category	   of	   quantity),	  Anticipations	   of	  
Perception	  (for	  the	  category	  of	  quality),	  Analogies	  of	  Experience	  (for	  the	  category	  of	   relation),	  and	  
Postulates	   of	   Empirical	   Thinking	   in	   General	   (for	   the	   category	   of	   modality).	   In	   the	   Metaphysical	  
Foundations	   of	   Natural	   Science,	   Kant	   addressed	   the	   issue	   of	   how	   to	   characterize	   the	   empirical	  
concept	   of	   “matter”	   according	   to	   the	   categories;	   hence,	   the	   four	   chapters	   on	   Phoronomy	  
(matter	   as	  motion),	   Dynamics	   (matter	   as	  the	   seat	  of	  moving	   forces),	  Mechanics	   (communication	  
of	  motion	   between	  parts	   of	  matter),	   and	  Phenomenology	  (matter	   as	  “the	  moveable	   insofar	   as	  it,	  
as	   such	   a	   thing,	   can	   be	   an	   object	   of	   experience”	   MFNS	   554).	   Thus,	   in	   Kant’s	   own	   account,	  
scientific	   concepts	   such	   as	   ‘force’,	   ‘momentum’,	  what	   he	   called	   ‘quantity	  of	   matter’	   (or	   inertial	  
mass)	   and	   so	   on	   were	   introduced	   as	   further	   specifications	   of	   the	   more	   general,	   albeit	   still	  
empirical,	   concept	   of	  matter,	  schematized	   according	   to	   the	   four	   categories	   of	  the	   understanding.	  
Out	   of	   Kant’s	  complex	   architectonic,	  the	   key	   insight	   remains	  that	  ‘objects	  of	  experience’,	  or	  what	  
Kant	   also	   called	   ‘phenomena’,	   are	   conceptualized	   appearances,	   and	   this	   becomes	   the	   relevant	  
working	   notion	  in	  my	  discussion	   (I	   have	   discussed	   the	   relevance	   of	   Kant’s	  notion	  of	   phenomena	  
for	  contemporary	  debates	   on	   realism,	   in	  Massimi	   2008	  and	   2011).	  
68	  I	   say	   ‘semi-­‐Davidsonian’	  because	  although	  in	   the	  relevant	  aforementioned	   section	  of	  
Realism	   with	   a	   Human	   Face,	   Putnam	   refers	   to	   Davidson’s	   meaning	   theory	   in	   claiming	   that	  
	  although	  Carnap	  and	   the	   Polish	   logician	   descriptions	  may	   be	   ‘mathematically	  equivalent’,	   still	  the	  
Polish	  logician’s	  sentence	  would	  not	  count	  as	   a	   truth-­‐condition	   for	  the	  Carnap	  sentence	  that	   there	  
are	   only	   three	   objects.	   Putnam	   takes	   the	   distance	   from	   Davidson’s	   ‘radical	   translator’	   thesis,	  
according	  to	   which	   for	   the	   sentence	   of	   the	   Polish	   logician	   to	   be	  meaningful	  in	  Carnap’s	  language	  
it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  offer	  truth-­‐conditions	   for	  it	  within	  Carnap’s	  language.	  See	  (Putnam,	  1990,	  p.	  
104).	  
69	  Transcendental	  arguments	  are	  at	   the	  center	   of	  an	   important	  literature	  that	   discusses	  their	  
relevance	   and	   effectiveness	  in	  addressing	   scepticism.	   See	  (Strawson,	   1966;	  Stroud,	   1968;	  Cassam,	  
1987;	  Harrison,	  1982;	  Pereboom,	  1990,	  2006)	  and	   Stern’s	  (1999)	  edited	   volume.	  
70	  Transcendental	   arguments	  are	  famously	  used	  by	  Kant	  in	  his	   Refutation	   of	  Idealism	  (added	  
to	   the	   second	   edition	   of	   the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  Reason,	   B275)	  as	  a	  way	  of	  going	   from	   our	  conscious	  
experience	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   there	  must	   be	   spatio-­‐temporal	   objects	   in	   nature.	   Taking	   the	  
lead	  from	  Kant,	  	  but	  going	  beyond	  Kant	  himself,	  some	  Kantian	   scholars	  have	  interpreted	   the	  use	  of	  
transcendental	   arguments	   	   in	   the	   Refutation	   of	   Idealism	   as	   a	   causal	   inference	   to	   a	   mind-­‐
independent	  ontology	  (most	   notably,	  Guyer,	   1987,	  and	   Dicker,	   2008);	  for	   a	  criticism	  of	  this	   causal	  
reading	   of	   Kant’s	   argument,	   see	   (Chignell	   2010,	   2011).	  My	   concern	   here	   is	   not	  with	   Kant’s	   own	  
Refutation	   of	   Idealism,	  nor	  with	   the	   use	   of	   transcendental	   arguments	   in	   addressing	  skepticism	  
about	   the	   external	   world	   as	   such.	   Instead,	   I	   envisage	   a	   contemporary	   different	   role	   for	  
transcendental	   arguments	   in	   addressing	   the	   charge	   of	   constructivism	   leveled	  against	   a	   Kantian	  
reading	   of	   natural	   kinds.	   Yet,	   mutatis	   mutandis,	   the	   strategy	   here	   adopted	   bears	   important	  
similarities	   with	   some	   of	   the	   issues	   concerning	   the	   ‘causal	   inference	   to	   reality’	   typical	   of	   the	  
aforementioned	  readings	   of	  Kant’s	   Refutation	  of	  Idealism.	  
71	   ‘Being	   causally	   structured’	   can	   in	   turn	   be	   understood	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   discipline-­‐specific	  
ways:	   e.g.,	   as	   having	   a	   certain	   acceleration	   in	   response	   to	   an	   impressed	   force	   (for	   physical	   kinds	  
described	   by	   Newtonian	   mechanics);	   or	   as	   having	   a	   certain	   ability	   to	   combine	   with	   some	  
chemical	   substances	  but	   not	   others	   (for	   chemical	   kinds);	   or	   as	   bearing	  evolutionary	   links	   with	  
other	   species	  (when	  dealing	  with	  biological	   taxa).	  
72	  A	   similar	   in	   spirit	   endeavour	   to	   naturalise	  Kantianism	   (although	  not	   directly	   functional	   to	  
the	   issue	   of	   natural	   kinds)	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Harrison	   (1982,	   p.	   223):	   “Just	   as	   the	   harmony	  
between	  the	  nature	  of	   an	  animal’s	  organs	  and	  the	  environment	  which	   it	   inhabits	  can	  be	   explained	  
by	   natural	  selection,	  so	   also	  can	  the	  harmony	  between	  a	   human’s	  general	  forms	  of	  judgment	  and	  
the	  world.	  In	  both	  cases	   it	  depends	  neither	  upon	  a	  designer	  nor	  upon	  pure	  luck,	  but	  is	   the	   result	  of	  
normal	  causal	  processes.	  Any	   individual	  who	   thinks	  (or	  acts	  as	   if)	  that	  there	  is	   no	   causation	  in	   the	  
world,	  or	  that	  the	   future	  does	   not	  resemble	   the	   past,	  is	   an	  unsuccessful	   mutation,	   ill-­‐adapted	  to	  
survive	   or	   breed.”	  Along	   similar	   lines,	   Westphal	   (1997,	  p.	   153):	   “our	   cognitive	   apparatus	   is	   such	  
that	   we	   are	   only	   receptive,	   sensitive,	   or	   cognitively	   competent	   with	   regard	   to	   certain	   kinds	   of	  
objects,	  although	  	  these	  objects	  would	  have	  the	  properties	  (whatever	  they	   may	   be)	   that	  enable	  us	  
to	   experience	   them,	   whether	   or	   not	   we	   ex-­‐	   isted	   or	   experienced	   them.	   This	   naturalistic	  
alternative	  is	  of	   course	   much	  more	  obvious	  after	  Darwin”.	  
73	  Weakening	  substitutions	   of	   this	  sort	  have	   famously	  been	   introduced	  by	   Barry	  Stroud	  in	  his	  
now	   classic	   treatment	   of	   transcendental	   arguments	  (1968).	   For	  a	   discussion	   of	   Stroud’s	  position	  
and	   the	  charge	  of	  idealism	  that	   seems	  to	  arise	  from	  weakening	   substitutions,	  see	  (Stern	  2000,	  ch.	  
2).	   Stroud’s	   challenge	   to	   transcendental	  arguments	  has	   prompted	  some	   philosophers	  to	   switch	  
from	   truth-­‐directed	   to	   belief-­‐directed	   transcendental	   arguments.	   For	   example,	   Stern	   himself	  
(1999)	   subscribes	   to	   the	   latter,	   whereby	   the	   more	   modest	   use	   of	   transcendental	   arguments	   is	  
	  functional	   to	   justify	   our	   beliefs	  about	   what	   there	   is,	  as	   opposed	   to	   justifying	   claims	   about	   what	  
there	   is,	   tout	   court.	   The	   result	   is	   a	   coherentist	   theory	   of	   epistemic	   justification,	   which	   would	  
explain	  how	  holding	   a	  particular	  belief	  that	   p	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  having	  experience	  insofar	  
as	  the	  belief	  that	  p	  coheres	  with	  a	  broader	  system	  of	  beliefs	  providing	  the	  necessary	   conditions	  of	  
possibility	   of	  our	   experience	   (a	   similar	   position	  is	  advocated	  by	  Stroud	  himself,	   see	  (Stroud	  1994);	  
for	   a	   discussion	   of	   this	   literature	  see	  (Pereboom	  2009).	  Belief-­‐directed	   transcendental	  arguments	  
and	   coherentist	  theory	   of	   justification	   are	   the	   target	   of	   Sacks	   (1999).	  Sacks	  mounts	   a	  compelling	  
criticism	   of	   the	   modest	   coherentist	   justificatory	   strategy	   as	   being	   incompatible	   with	   the	  
correspondence	   theory	  of	   truth,	  among	  other	  pitfalls.	   Once	   more,	   my	   concern	  here	   is	   not	  with	  
the	   idealist	   threat	   that	   arises	   from	   Stroud’s	  weakening	   substitution;	   instead,	   I	   am	   interested	   in	  
looking	   at	   possible	   ways	   of	   using	   transcendental	   arguments	   to	   make	   the	   case	   for	   a	   form	   of	  
Kantianism	  about	  kinds	   that	  can	   escape	   the	   charge	   of	   constructivist	  mind-­‐dependence.	  Hence,	  in	  
this	   context,	  I	  use	  the	  weakening	   substitution	  for	   a	  possible	   constructivist’s	  rejoinder	  to	   the	  mild	  
realism	   licensed	  by	  naturalised	  Kantianism.	  Moreover,	  since	  my	  goal	   is	  to	  argue	   for	  a	  mild	  form	  of	  
realism	  about	  natural	  kinds,	  I	   see	   transcendental	   arguments	  as	   truth-­‐directed	   rather	  than	  belief-­‐
directed,	  following	  Harrison	   (1982)	   (see	   footnote	  72).	   One	   may	   wonder	  how	   one	  can	   reasonably	  
uphold	   truth-­‐directed	   transcendental	   arguments	   despite	   Stroud’s	   challenge.	   In	   response,	  
wedding	   transcendental	   arguments	  with	   Quinean	  naturalism	   secures	   causal	   inference	  to	   reality.	  
For,	   although	   apparent	   features	   that	   do	   not	   track	   nature’s	   properties	   (because,	   say,	   due	   to	   a	  
collective	  hallucination	  or	  other)	   could	  well	  feature	   in	  weakening	   substitutions	  of	  transcendental	  
arguments	  as	   indicated	   above,	   they	  could	   not	   explain	   the	   survival-­‐adaptive	  nature	  of	  our	   kinds.	   If	  
emeralds	   were	  not	   green,	   salt	  not	   soluble	   in	  water,	   and	   so	  forth;	   i.e.,	   if	  these	  were	  just	  apparent	  
features	   of	   our	   beliefs	   about	  emeralds,	   salt,	   etc.,	   we,	   as	  Homo	   Sapiens,	   would	   not	   stand	   much	  
chance	  of	  finding	  our	  way	  around	  nature.	  
74	  This	   suggestion	   follows	  a	   similar	   one	  by	  Quassim	   Cassam	   in	  a	  different	   context,	   namely	  his	  
discussion	   of	   the	   fate	   of	   transcendental	  arguments	  on	   the	   score	  of	   transcendental	   idealism,	  see	  
(Cassam	   1987,	   p.	   370).	   Once	   more,	   my	   concern	   here	   is	   not	   with	   idealism,	   but	   with	   a	  
constructivist’s	   reply	   that	  mutatis	  mutandis	  bears	  enough	  similarity	   to	   the	   idealist	   threat	   to	   justify	  
an	  analogous	  use	  of	  argumentative	  resources	   in	  response.	  
75	  In	   this	  sense,	  my	  proposal	  is	  in	  line	  with	  similar	  ones	  that	   in	  recent	  decades	  have	  pledged	  to	  
go	   back	   to	   Kant	   without	   trying	   to	   retrieve	   Kant’s	   notion	   of	   necessity.	   Friedman	   (2001),	   for	  
example,	   has	   reinterpreted	  Kant’s	   a	   priori	  as	   consisting	   of	   two	   components:	  namely,	   (1)	  being	  a	  
necessary	   and	   unchangeable	   condition	  of	   possibility	   of	   experience,	   and	   (2)	   being	   constitutive	  of	  
the	   object	   of	   experience,	   whereby	   only	   the	   latter	   maintains	   its	   relevance	   for	   contemporary	  
debates	   in	   philosophy	  of	   physics	   (in	   particular,	   in	   assessing	   the	   nature	  of	   the	   light	   principle	   and	  
the	   equivalence	   principle	   in	   special	   and	  general	   relativity).	  The	   relativised	   a	   priori	   is	   designed	  to	  
retain	   Kantian	  insights	   for	   twentieth	  century	   science,	  despite	   the	   challenge	   posed	   by	  Kuhn’s	  view	  
of	   scientific	   revolutions.	  The	   version	   of	   naturalised	  Kantianism	  here	   expounded	  shares	   the	  spirit	  
of	  Friedman’s	  proposal,	  without	  yet	  endorsing	   its	  defence	  of	  the	  constitutive	  a	  priori.	  
76	  Here	   I	   have	   in	   mind	  the	  sort	  of	   complex	  historical	  transformations	   that	   for	  example	  Mark	  
Wilson	   has	   so	   aptly	   described	   as	   far	   as	   the	   evolution	   of	   Newtonian	   classical	   mechanics	   is	  
concerned,	   see	  (Wilson,	   2006).	  The	   dynamical,	   patchy,	   and	   localized	   evolution	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  
force	   in	  the	  treatment	  of	  classical	  continuum	  mechanics	   and	   the	   indispensable	   need	  to	   introduce	  
additional	  concepts	   alien	  to	  mechanics	  and	  belonging	   to	  chemistry	   and	   thermodynamics	   justifies	  
Wilson’s	  claim	   that	   Newtonian	  mechanics	   is	  only	   a	   theory	   fac¸ade.	   Interestingly	   enough,	   Michael	  
	  Friedman,	   in	   a	   recent	   exchange	   with	   Wilson,	   has	   appealed	   to	   the	   same	   case	   study	   to	   draw	  
analogies	   with	   his	   Kantian	   dynamics	   of	   reason.	   See	   (Friedman,	   2010;	   Wilson,	   2010).	   I	   thank	  
Mark	  Wilson	   for	   sharing	   with	  me	  manuscript	  correspondence.	  
77	   In	   Quine’s	   words,	   “Creatures	   inveterately	   wrong	   in	   their	   inductions	   have	   a	   pathetic	   but	  
praiseworthy	  tendency	   to	  die	  before	   reproducing	  their	   kind”	   (1969),	  p.	  126).	  
78	  See	  footnote	  72	  for	  quote	   from	  Harrison	  (1982).	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